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Abstract
We are developing and evaluating design concepts and principles to guide
in the building of cooperative problem-solving systems. In particular, we
are studying the design of cooperative systems for enroute flight planning.
Our investigation involves a three-stage process, modeling human
performance in existing environments, building cognitive artifacts, and
studying the performance of people working in collaboration with these
artifacts. This report focuses on the most significant design concepts and
principles we have identified thus far.
Introduction
Broadly speaking, we are studying design concepts and principles to guide
in the development of cooperative problem-solving systems. The
assumption behind this approach is that there are many important
problems that computers alone cannot solve acceptably well. Hence, there
is a need to study methods for enhancing cooperative performance by
humans and computers.
More specifically, we are studying the design of cooperative planning
systems to aid in the replanning of flights while enroute. We have
selected enroute flight planning because it is an important practical
problem for commercial aviation, and because it serves as an excellent
testbed for studying the design of cooperative problem-solving systems.
Res@_r¢h Approach
There are many ways to gain insights into the design of aids for enroute
flight planning. One approach is to study performance in existing
environments. Surveys can be conducted to identify problems and critical
incidents. The ASRS database can be explored. Accident investigation
reports can be analyzed. Simulation studies can be conducted.
A second approach is to study the general literature on human planning and
problem solving. Behaviors observed in other contexts, and models of the
cognitive processes underlying these behaviors, may provide insights
useful for understanding flight planning performance.
A third approach is to study the literatures on the design and use of
computer aids. This includes reviewing the fields of artificial
intelligence, knowledge-based systems, applied optimization and human-
computer interaction.
The first three approaches are all very valuable. They help us to identify
problems in enroute flight planning that need to be solved. They help us to
understand the nature of the task and the task environment. They also
help us to gain insights into the strengths and weaknesses of people
performing planning tasks, and the availability of computer aids to assist
with such tasks.
We have therefore made use of all three approaches. We have conducted
surveys; we have run simulator studies in existing cockpit environments;
we have reviewed relevant literatures. Appendix A contains reports
discussing such efforts.
These approaches merely provide the foundation for our work, however. It
is useful to know that people sometimes fixate on hypotheses they have
generated; it is useful to know that the efficiency of computerized
planning systems can be markedly increased by the use of abstraction
hierarchies; it is useful to know that pilots currently play a major role in
detecting the need to replan, and in generating alternative plans. In order
to make significant progress, though, we need to synthesize such
background information into an understanding of the problem area and to
specify a set of design principles to guide in system development. We
then need to apply these principles to develop specific implementations.
Finally, we need to empirically test these implementations and,
indirectly, test the underlying design principles.
In order to progress toward such empirical evaluations, we have built a
Flight Planning Testbed. Below, we describe characteristics of this
testbed. Then we discuss the specific design concepts we are exploring,
and the relationships of these design concepts to various aspects of the
flight planning problem.
Development of e PrototvPina Tool
Our research plan calls for a two-stage approach to testing design
concepts. The first stage involves the use of a part-task simulation in
order to develop design concepts and complete an initial evaluation. Those
concepts that prove most promising based on this initial evaluation will
then be used in the second stage of testing. This second stage will involve
evaluation in the NASA Ames Advanced Concepts Simulator.
In order to run experiments using a part-task simulation, we had to design
a suitable development environment. We consequently built a prototyping
tool that can support the development and testing of a variety of design
concepts.
This prototyping shell, designed to run on a Mac II, provides a general
environment for developing application software, but does not prohibit
programmers from modifying the environment if necessary. Written in
Lightspeed C, the system can control displays on up to six color monitors.
This prototyping tool supports the creation and use of multiple window
displays on each screen and the use of both mouse and keyboard inputs.
The tool also provides both real-time and simulation-time clocks to
control the timing of events and to record response times. The system
records the time and nature of all actions made by a subject, and can
replay the entirety of a subject's actions at a later time.
Development of a Fliqht Planninq Testbed
Using our prototyping tool, we have developed a Flight Planning Testbed
that will provide the foundation capabilities for our studies. This testbed
has several important features which are described below.
MaD DisDlay
Our testbed is capable of generating an accurate map display for any
portion of the world. To accomplish this, we have ported to the Mac II a
program (and associated database) that was developed using data from the
U.S. Geological Survey. This program can produce accurate displays of any
portion of the world, using any one of several available map projections.
Our testbed also allows for easy, rapid display of weather information on
this map display. By simply pressing buttons with a mouse, the pilot can
select a variety of weather overlays (radar weather, jet streams, fronts,
etc.) to display on the map (see the second photo). In this manner, the
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pilot can personalize the weather display to meet his/her current needs.
Furthermore, by double-clicking with the mouse on any portion of the map
display, the pilot can zoom in on the region, seeing a close-up display.
In order to facilitate viewing trend information, the pilot can also view
weather sequences over time on the map display. This is accomplished by
moving the plane along its route on the map. The plane is moved using a
scroll bar controlled by the mouse.
The map display can also show radar weather information at different
altitudes. (The National Weather Center has indicated that such data will
be available nationally within the next five years.)
In addition to presenting weather information, the map display can show
up to four alternative routes for the plane. It also displays the location of
the plane on the active route. Both the plane's location and the weather
displays are updated over time during the simulation.
Routes can be created or changed on the map display in two ways. One way
is by direct manipulation of routes on the map itself using the mouse.
With the mouse, the pilot can bend routes to deviate around some area.
The pilot can also create new legs off an existing path. Finally, the pilot
can create a totally new route (see the third picture).
A second way to create or change routes is described in the section on the
Route Information Display. In that window, changes to routes can be made
using the keyboard.
Information Alert Window
This Flight Planning Testbed also includes a window that can display
important alerts to the pilot at appropriate times during the simulation.
Communication_ Window
The testbed has another window that provides a text editing environment
for preparing and sending written messages to Dispatch (see the fourth
photo). Routes drawn by the pilot on the Map Display could be transmitted
to Dispatch along with this text.
Airport Information Window
This window displays both static information (number of runways, etc.)
and changing information (weather, NOTAMS, etc.) about specific airports.
The pilot can request such information by typing in the airport's identifier
or by scrolling through an alphabetical list and selecting the airport with
the mouse (see the fifth photo).
Route Information Display
The Map Display provides a graphic presentation of weather data.
are other types of information, however, that are probably better
There
displayed in a text format. We have developed a spreadsheet concept to
present such information.
The sixth photo shows one of the spreadsheet displays available in our
Testbed. Several important features are illustrated. First, the layout of
data in the form of a spreadsheet seems well suited to this application.
The horizontal sequence of information on the spreadsheet corresponds to
the horizontal sequence of waypoints and jet routes along the flight path.
Information specific to particular waypoints and jet routes is displayed
under the column with the corresponding waypoint or jet route label.
Second, the spreadsheet allows the pilot to immediately view the
implications of a change in the flight plan. The pilot can make changes in
the plane's route on the spreadsheet by simply adding or deleting the
appropriate waypoints. These changes in the route are immediately drawn
on the Map Display. (Alternatively, the pilot can change the route by
direct manipulation of the path shown on the Map Display. These changes
are propagated to the spreadsheet.) The pilot can also make changes in the
planned altitudes and power settings on the spreadsheet.
When a change is made in the flight plan, the system will appropriately
change the other information displayed (such as arrival time and fuel
consumption). The spreadsheet allows the pilot to view a variety of such
information, such as wind components and distances between waypoints,
as well as fuel consumption and arrival time information.
A third important feature of the display shown in the sixth photo is the
ability to display information about two routes at the same time. This
facilitates comparisons of two alternative routes under consideration.
The seventh photo shows a second spreadsheet display that pilots can
access. Using this display, the pilot can only look at a single route at a
time, but can see information about that route in greater detail. In
particular, this spreadsheet allows the pilot to easily compare different
information about altitudes along his/her route. The pilot can display
information such as turbulence, fuel consumption and wind components at
these different altitudes. To facilitate such comparisons, the pilot can
display the current altitude profile, optimal altitude profile and maximum
altitudes. These kinds of information are displayed graphically within the
spreadsheet itself.
Fliqht Plannina Testbed - Summary
Using our prototyping tool, we have implemented a number of design
concepts to support flight planning. The concepts were developed based on
our cognitive task analysis of the performances of pilots in the simulation
study (Galdes and Smith, 1990).
Desiqn Concepts
In studying the design of aids for enroute flight planning, we have
encountered a number of relevant design concepts that apply. These are
discussed below. The value of such a list of concepts (and examples of
their applications) is their ability to stimulate the thinking of system
designers. The designer must still consider his or her particular context
in order to assess the validity of a particular design concept, and to
generate ideas on how to apply it to his/her specific problem area. By
considering such a list of concepts, however, the designer of some new
system may come up with solutions that might otherwise be overlooked.
Concept 1. Use data abstractions to help planners deal
effectively with large quantities of data.
In the near future, the amount of information that could be provided to the
people responsible for enroute flight planning could be greatly increased.
Data about passenger connections, flight crew schedules and air traffic
congestion is already available for use. In addition, the technology exists
to provide detailed, frequently updated weather information. Every plane
in the sky is a potential weather sensor transmitting data about
turbulence, winds, etc. to ground stations. (United and Northwest Airlines
are already experimenting with this.) In addition, wind profiles, NexRad,
ACARS and automated weather stations will be available to provide
further detailed weather data.
Three questions arise:
.
2.
3.
What data should actually be provided to planners?
How should this data be displayed and utilized?
Who should have access to what data (ATC or
Dispatch or the flight crew)?
In this section we deal with one answer to the second question.
Consider a system where an international turbulence map is available and
updated regularly. The quantity of data to consider is huge.
Clearly, the planner for a particular flight can begin by focusing attention
on the airspace along that flight's route. With up to 20 flight segments
for longer flights, however, the number of relevant pieces of data is still
very large.
We need some way to help the planner focus attention on potential
problem areas, and on likely solutions. Our current design illustrates one
solution, using a data abstraction.
Consider our detailed spreadsheet display. The spreadsheet displays
turbulence reports for each of.several altitudes along the route. It also
displays (as a colored line) the planned altitude profile.
It would be impossible to display detailed turbulence data within such a
compact display. Indeed, the pilots we have tested with our system
indicate that, for just one individual flight segment, there could be
considerable variation in turbulence levels at different points.
We could simply create a listing of all the turbulence information for all
of the points along the route for all of the nearby altitudes. Instead, we
are using our spreadsheet display to present an abstraction of this
turbulence information. The label (light, moderate, etc.) in the
spreadsheet cell indicates the maximum turbulence level along that
segment at that altitude.
Imagine a planner who wants to ask:
Am I likely to encounter significant turbulence in the next
segment of my flight?
He/she can simply scan along the altitude profile as displayed in the
spreadsheet and see whether any of the flight segments show significant
turbulence. If, for instance, one segment indicates moderate turbulence,
he/she can click on that cell, opening a window which describes in detail
the nature and extent of the turbulence along that segment. (Graphics
could also be included in this text window.)
Imagine this same planner asking:
Can I avoid this moderate turbulence by changing altitude?
He/she can simply scan the spreadsheet cells, looking for an altitude
corresponding to that flight segment that has less turbulence indicated.
Thus, our flight planning testbed will allow us to study the effectiveness
of such data abstractions in helping the planner to detect potential
problems in a timely manner, and to generate potential solutions. The
above described form of abstraction can be applied to both turbulence data
and wind components. An analogous form of data abstraction applies to
the map display, where the planner can zoom in on a region and get more
detailed information about weather and airport locations.
Concept 2. Allow direct manipulation of graphic
displays to enhance exploration.
Our preliminary tests indicate that pilots are very enthusiastic about the
ability to graphically create and manipulate routes. The ability to make
the changes directly on the map display appears to make it much easier to
explore alternate routes to avoid bad weather.
Using our map display, the planner can also move the plan along the route
and watch the forecast weather change. This helps the planner to assess
trends in the weather and their potential impact on the flight. It also
helps the planner to answer questions such as:
Am I likely to encounter bad weather at my destination?
If the answer is affirmative, the pilot may want to add extra fuel (if this
potential problem is noted before takeoff) or identify suitable alternate
airports.
In our detailed spreadsheet display, the planner will also be able to
manipulate the altitude profile graphically. The planner can edit the text
display to change the altitude for a flight segment. He/she can also,
however, simply drag the the altitude profile (displayed as a colored line)
up or down in order to explore alternative altitudes.
Concept 3. Support planning and plan evaluation at
many levels of detail.
Sacerdoti (1974) discusses the use of abstraction hierarchies to improve
the efficiency of planning systems. Based on an analogy to this idea, we
have developed a system where the human planner can develop plans at
several levels of detail.
Flight planning is well characterized in terms of such an abstraction
hierarchy. Imagine, for instance, a pilot flying from San Francisco to
Detroit who learns of a line of thunderstorms crossing his flight path over
the Plains States. His primary decision is whether to deviate north or
south of this storm. In order to evaluate this choice, however, it is
necessary to specify additional details. Waypoints, altitudes and power
settings must also be specified.
In order to support this goal, we propose a system where:
•
.
.
The pilot first sketches out a general solution
(such as a northern deviation around the storm)•
This sketch is drawn on the Map Display;
By default, the computer fills in the lower level
details, finding waypoints that approximate the
pilot's sketch, finding an "optimal" altitude profile
for this path and finding suitable power settings;
The pilot then evaluates the details of this solution
by looking at the spreadsheet displaying route
information. If he chooses to, he can alter the
computer's recommendations for the lower level
details and compare his choices with the
computer's. (He may, for instance, note that the
computer's "optimal" altitude profile flies the
plane through areas with unacceptable turbulence.)
Consider another situation where the pilot encounters turbulence. He/she
wants to decide whether to go higher or lower. Using the spreadsheet
display, he/she can directly generate and evaluate alternative altitudes.
Thus, we have designed a system where:
.
.
Displays exist corresponding to different levels of
detail in the planning hierarchy;
The pilot can view and make changes on any of
these displays. He/she can therefore make changes
at any level of detail desired. He/she can also,
therefore, look at the data needed to evaluate
w.
decisions at that level of detail;
The computer, by default, handles lower levels of
details. The pilot can, however, compare the
computer's recommendations with his/her own
ideas and make changes as desired at any level of
detail.
Thus, using this architecture, the pilot can easily explore "what if"
questions at any level of detail desired.
Concept 4. Create a microworld in which the planner
can actively explore "what-if" questions and
get useful feedback to help in evaluating
alternative plans.
In our simulation studies and interviews pilots repeatedly express the
desire to ask "what-if" questions of the computer. They generally feel
that it's fine for the computer to suggest a plan and indicate the predicted
fuel consumption and arrival time, but that it is also extremely important
to give them the ability to explore alternatives. Our testbed environment
provides such an environment.
The planner can change any of the flight parameters (route segments,
altitudes or power settings). The system fills in the lower level details
(see Concept 3) and estimates fuel consumption and arrival times for this
new flight path.
Concept 5. Support a variety of planning "models" to
accommodate different situations and
people.
In our simulator studies, we observed several different planning "models"
in use. An effective cooperative system should probal_ly accommodate all
four of these "models."
Planning Model 1. The most common cause of flight amendments is
some localized disturbance that makes the plane's original flight plan
undesirable or impossible. Typical causes include:
•
2.
3.
4.
the development of areas of turbulence;
the unexpected formation of localized storms;
changes in winds at different altitudes;
the appearance of other air traffic that prevents
planned altitude changes.
Example 1. ATC informs the crew that they will have to stay at flight
level 250 longer than planned (instead of going to FL270) because of other
air traffic. The crew considers the effects of this change on fuel
consumption and arrival times. The effects are significant but acceptable
if no alternatives are available. The crew generates one minor
modification to try to make up some of the fuel consumption. They ask
ATC whether, once cleared to FL270, they can then proceed up to FL330
earlier than planned. This will now be possible because of the extra fuel
consumption, which will lighten the plane ahead of the planned schedule.
Example 2. The flight crew notes that they are behind schedule and
burning up more fuel than expected under the original plan. They conclude
that the problem is a headwind that is stronger than expected under their
original plan. The crew asks ATC whether there are any reports on winds
at other altitudes. They learn that the headwinds are now favorable at
lower altitudes. They compare the tradeoff between the benefits of the
lower headwinds and the cost of flying at the lower altitude, and decide it
is preferable to fly at a lower altitude. They request clearance from ATC
to do so.
Example 3. The flight crew encounters light to moderate turbulence. They
consider changing altitudes to avoid it, or slowing the plane to reduce its
effects. They check for pilot reports on the likely duration and magnitude
of the turbulence at that altitude, and on turbulence levels at other
altitudes. The turbulence is reported to be very localized, so they decide
to ride it out.
Example 4. The onboard radar indicates the presence of a thunderstorm
along the current path. The crew requests information about tops, and
concludes the storm is too high to climb over. Since the storm is not too
extensive, they ask ATC to simply vector them south of the storm.
Planning Behavior. Our data indicate that, currently, flight crews
generally respond to such localized disturbances by generating solutions
that are minor modifications of the original plan. In most cases, the crew
doesn't replan the entire remainder of the flight, they simply select an
immediate response to the local problem and act on it. They assume that
they will be able to find additional minor modifications for the remainder
of the flight when the need arises (Suchman, 1987).
Model 1 Discussion. Three points merit discussion. First, under these
circumstances, plans are generated by attempting to make minor
modifications to the original flight plan. It is assumed that, because the
modifications are small, the potential implications for later in the flight
do not have to be considered in detail. It is assumed that any later
modifications made necessary by the current change will again be minor,
and that acceptable modifications will be possible.
A second point is that such planning is very decentralized. ATC looks at
the local implications in terms of air traffic, but other than that, no one
evaluates the effects of the requested amendments on the overall system.
No one says "there's been a disturbance, let's now replan everyone's flight"
to ensure "optimal" or good overall system performance.
This decentralized approach to planning makes strong assumptions about
the "world." It assumes that the flight plans of different planes are not
tightly coupled. Small changes in one plane's plan do not result in
significant disruptions of other plane's plans, or of overall system
performance. It also assumes that the "world" generally allows a variety
of small changes to be made. Consequently, it is unnecessary to
anticipate the availability of future modifications that will be made
necessary by the current minor modification. It is assumed that some
acceptable modification will always be available to meet future needs.
The third point is that, at present, such localized planning is accomplished
in one of two ways. The first method can be characterized as a simple
forward search with a short planning horizon. The pilot looks at the
immediately available alternatives (changes in altitude, vectoring around
the storm or turbulence, slowing down to reduce the effects of turbulence,
etc.) and picks the one that seems to best solve his/her immediate
problem. The second method is somewhat analogous to case-based
reasoning (Riesbeck and Schank, 1987), except that the pilots access a
broader "institutional" memory. They ask ATC whether any other pilots
have already found a solution to the immediate problem and then make use
of that solution.
Our present design currently supports such decentralized, localized
planning. The planner can use the map display to find a set of waypoints
that take the plane around a storm. The planner can also view the detailed
spreadsheet and look at fuel consumption, winds and turbulence for the
next flight segment in order to decide whether to change altitude. It
would also be possible to support the case-based reasoning solution by
providing the planner with access to already tried localized solutions that
have been successful.
Planning Model 2. Under Planning Model 1, the planner doesn't worry too
much about a complete path to his/her destination. He/she simply finds
an amendment that solves the immediate problem and assumes that the
remainder of the solution can be worked out when the time comes. We
also saw cases where the pilots in our simulator study worked out the
entire flight plan after proposing an amendment.
In such cases, planning was again very decentralized. No one asked:
What's best for the whole system? ATC did, to some extent, look at the
interactions among planes and put constraints on the solutions. The flight
crew simply searched for a solution for their own plane alone that met
these constraints.
There are several ways in which a flight planning aid could support such
planning. The first would be to provide the raw data and calculations
(winds, turbulence, fuel consumption, etc.) necessary for the (human)
planner to work out a complete solution using forward search methods.
The second would again mimic case-based reasoning approaches,
borrowing from already generated solutions used by other planes.
The third approach mimics current human-to-human interactions. In our
simulation studies, we sometimes saw pilots develop fairly abstract
plans and then let ATC or Dispatch work out the details. They would say
things like:
"Can you find us a route north of this storm?" or
"We need a new destination airport."
By supporting planning at different levels of abstraction, our testbed
mimics some aspects of this human-to-human interaction. Additional
features worth considering based on this model, however, include allowing
the (human) planner to specify a goal or constraint (such as "find a route
that gets me to my destination within 10 minutes of my scheduled arrival
time" or "find me an alternate destination" or "find a good airport that I
can reach within 30 minutes" or "find an airport that I can reach and still
have adequate holding fuel."
Planning Model 2 - Discussion. Planning Model 2 has two important
characteristics. First, like Planning Model 1, the planner doesn't worry
(too much) about finding global solutions that lead to good overall
solutions for all of the air traffic. Second, unlike Planning Model 1, the
planner works out the entire remainder of the flight. He/she uses a much
longer planning horizon.
Finally, as discussed above, our simulation data suggests that pilots
currently use a variety of solutions to generate such plans. They use
forward search methods; they use case-based reasoning; they plan at
higher levels of abstraction and then offload planning to another agent by
merely specifying a goal or constraint. All of these methods have
potentially important implications for building computer aids.
Planning Model 3. Planning Models 1 and 2 involved looking for
solutions from a decentralized perspective. The planner (the flight crew
in this case) looked for a plan that was good for him/her without directly
considering whether that plan was good from a global perspective. (The
global perspective was still partially considered by ATC when deciding
whether to approve a requested change in altitude, etc.)
A third planning model that we have seen in use involves explicitly
considering the bigger picture.. Such planning is currently done by ATC and
Dispatch. This model is typically invoked when there is some large,
systemic disturbance (a line of thunderstorms, airport closings, etc.). In
such a case, ATC and Dispatch look for broader solutions that consider the
overall implications for all of the air traffic (or at least that airline's).
At present, this global planning involves both elements of cooperation and
competition. Dispatch would like to get the best solutions for his/her
airline. ATC would like to get good overall solutions.
From the flight crew's perspective, such planning often takes the form of
case-based reasoning. The crew is informed that ATC has developed a
preferred alternate plan for planes along that path, or that Dispatch has a
recommendation. The crew then evaluates this plan to ensure that it is
acceptable to them.
Concept 5 - Discussion. Above, we describe a variety of planning
"models" and methods that we have observed in use under current
circumstances. These observations are of considerable importance, as it
is likely that an effective cooperative system should support such
alternative "models" and planning methods.
Concept 6. Use graphics to enhance perceptual
processes, helping the planner to "see" the
important patterns instead of making
him/her laboriously "reason" about the data
in order to infer their presence.
The attention literature makes a distinction between automatic
recognition processes and controlled processes. Larkin and Simon (1987)
suggest this concept can be fruitfully applied to designing aids for
problem-solving.
The most interesting application of this concept to flight planning is with
the map display. By allowing the planner to view the plane moving along
its route, viewing concomitant changes in the weather, the planner may
find it much easier to judge trends and note important patterns.
The detailed spreadsheet illustrates another simple application of this
concept. By embedding graphics identifying the current flight plan,
"optimal" plan and maximum altitudes into the spreadsheet, it should be
much easier for the planner to identify pertinent data and make
comparisons at different altitudes. We may also embed cloud TOPS into
the spreadsheet at some point.
Concept 7. When using graphics, provide a "natural"
mapping between the features of the display
and the corresponding concepts or real-
world objects.
The map display is an obvious application of this concept. The detailed
spreadsheet is also consistent with it, however. The spreadsheet depicts
the horizontal movement along jetways as a horizontal sequence of cells
on the spreadsheet. Each successive column represents the next waypoint
or jet route in sequence. (An interesting conflict arises, though, when the
plane is flying east to west. Should the sequence on the spreadsheet now
go from right to left to be consistent with the orientation of the map
display?)
The altitude information at the bottom of the spreadsheet is also
consistent with this principle. Higher altitudes for a flight segment are
represented as higher cells in the spreadsheet.
There is also "another inconsistency with this principle. The length of
flight segments is not reflected at all in the graphics on the detailed
spreadsheet. All spreadsheet columns are equally wide, even though the
flight segments they represent differ in length. We have experimented
with displays where segment lengths were drawn to scale. Segment
lengths differ greatly, however, and our preliminary judgment was that it
would be better to tradeoff in favor of compactness of the display
(allowing the planner to see more flight segments at a time) rather than
having pictorial realism.
Concept 8. Consider distributing the problem-solving to
simplify the tasks for individual
participants.
At present, there are several parties involved in flight planning. The
flight crew plays a major role in detecting problems that require
replanning. The flight crew also does much of the replanning. ATC
sometimes generates some of the details of a plan, but often ATC plays a
reactive role, telling the flight crew whether an amendment they have
proposed is feasible given other air traffic. Similarly, Dispatch often
plays a reactive role, relying on the flight crew to detect a problem and to
suggest a solution.
These roles depend very much on the time-criticality of the problem and
its nature. Dispatch is more likely to play a major role in selecting an
alternative destination, for instance, than in proposing a change in
altitude to avoid turbulence.
It is clear, though, that there is a decomposition of flight planning
activities that allows different parties to deal with different aspects of
the flight planning problem. Such task decompositions need to be
considered when deciding who should have access to what information and
computer aids.
Concept 9. Consider including redundancy in a
distributed problem-solving environment to
increase the likelihood that good solutions
will not be overlooked and that bad
solutions will not be accepted.
In addition to reducing the cognitive load by distributing tasks among
different parties, such shared problem-solving may benefit from
intentional or chance occurrences of redundancy. Dispatch, for example,
may notice that a flight amendment proposed by the flight crew leaves
very little holding fuel and recommend finding an alternative plan.
In designing the planning environment, we may want to use computers and
advanced communication capabilities to enhance such intended and
incidental redundancy. There may be data and information that we want to
deliberately present to multiple parties. This may include presenting the
computer's conclusions, explorations and warnings to the flight crew and
Dispatch (and in some cases, to ATC as well).
The literature on human error discusses such things as the generation of
false assumptions (Smith, Giffin, Rockwell and Thomas, 1986), and
fixations on incorrect hypotheses or unwise solutions. In our simulation
study we saw one example of such behavior. One crew appeared to fixate
on Toledo as an alternate destination after Detroit was closed. Initially,
it appeared to be a reasonable alternative, but given the questionable
weather in the area and the progressively lower fuel levels, it was a very
dubious choice to commit to while over Gopher. The crew never asked: Do
we have enough fuel to go elsewhere if the weather at Toledo turns bad (or
if air traffic congestion develops)?
Similarly, we saw several cases where flight crews failed to consider the
implications of certain events (being held at a lower than planned
altitude) or actions (flying faster than normal cruise speeds). Appropriate
aids to enhance distributed problem-solving might help reduce such
"errors."
Concept 10. Design assuming that novel
arise that will make invalid
and conclusions made by the
situations will
certain inferences
computer system.
It is clear that knowledge-based systems and optimization programs have
limited scope. It is quite probable that situations will arise that were
not anticipated by the system designers.
One solution is to provide the computer system with explicit error
detectors (Smith, Smith, Svirbely, Miller, Glades, Fraser, Blazina and
Kennedy, in press) and with metaknowledge. To the extent that the
computer knows what it does and doesn't know, it will be better able to
detect situations where it is "over its head."
This solution simply reduces the likelihood that the computer will
unknowingly generate a questionable plan. There is still the likelihood
that the system designers will leave out important metaknowledge to
detect some novel situations.
A second solution, therefore, is to keep people actively engaged in the
planning activities, and to attempt to ensure that they consider important
data as well as recommendations by the computer (or another person).
This requires careful consideration of the roles of various agents (human
and computer) as well as the design and distribution of data displays.
Concept 11. Let the computer actively monitor the data
and provide alerts when important changes
are detected.
Planners sometimes make assumptions that are invalid and consequently
fail to check for important information. One pilot we interviewed
provided an example of such behavior:
A flight into Cleveland had Columbus as the scheduled
alternate airport. As they approached Cleveland, the weather
progressively worsened. Cleveland was shut down before they
arrived there. The crew therefore changed course to Columbus.
As they approached Columbus, they talked to ATC and
announced their intention to land on a particular runway. ATC
responded that this runway was under construction and was
only half its normal length. ATC gave them an alternative
which required circling and approaching from a different
direction. The crew responded that, due to the bad weather
they had encountered and the diversion from Cleveland, they
did not have enough fuel to circle and land on the alternative
runway. They had to make an emergency landing on the
shortened runway (and did so successfully).
If they had checked the available NOTAMS for Columbus, the crew would
have learned of the runway construction. They failed to do so, however,
assuming that since this was their scheduled alternate, there were no
problems. This failure, compounded by the excessive fuel consumption,
led to the emergency.
A partial solution to such problems is to develop more intelligent alerting
capabilities for the computer. Such alerts need to be as context sensitive
as possible. Their goal should be to focus the planner's attention on
important data or problems that might otherwise be unnoticed.
Concept 12. Be sure there is a clear, easy to understand
conceptual model for controlling and
understanding the computer's processing.
Lehner (1987) suggests that computers need not think exactly like their
human partners. The human simply needs to understand how the computer
is reasoning so that he/she can assess the appropriateness of its
recommendations.
Current flight planning systems often use optimization techniques to
generate recommendations (Sorensen, 1982). These have a major problem:
What does it mean to the human planner when the computer
states that it has found the "best" plan to optimize a
particular objective function that weights fuel consumption,
arrival time and turbulence?
It may be possible to reduce some of these problems by placing a
knowledge-based system (a "translator") between the person and the
optimization program. The knowledge-based system could accept inputs
such as "find a plan that gets me to my destination by 0400," and then
translate this into an appropriate constraint on the optimization. This
solution reduces, but does not necessarily eliminate, problems of
cognitive compatibility. The person still has to understand how the
computer arrives at its solution. (Does it, for instance, consider
turbulence and, if so, how?). This understanding must include a
recognition by the user of the limitations or brittleness of the computer's
algorithms.
Concept 13. Try to predict the errors that components of
the system, individually or jointly, could
make. Try to design the overall system to
prevent errors. Equally important, try to
design the system so that errors (including
those that haven't been predicted) are likely
to be caught, or failing that, so that their
impacts are not serious.
In our interviews and in our simulator studies, the most serious
situations seem to result from a combination of three factors:
•
o
,
Using a short planning-horizon to solve some
immediate problem (thus failing to consider long-
run implications);
Failing to discard the current plan early enough,
while there are still many alternative options
available;
Experiencing the occurrence of a series of events
that, taken together, seriously threaten the plane's
safety, even though each one alone would normally
be a minor problem.
Under Concept 5, we describe a model of planning in which planning is very
localized, in which the pilot finds a solution to the immediate problem
without considering in detail the implications for later in the flight. This
form of planning assumes a "friendly" world, where there are numerous
alternatives to select from to solve the next step in developing a plan.
Under such an assumption, there is no great need to look beyond solving
the immediate problem.
In flight planning, the assumption of a "friendly" world is normally quite
viable. The plane has reserve fuel, keeping many options open. The plane
can land somewhere else if fuel, weather, etc. make this necessary.
Finally, the pilot can request priority clearances if the situation is
becoming sufficiently difficult, thus gaining additional options.
Occasionally, however, the flight crew finds itself in a less "friendly"
world. Based on our interviews, this seems to arise for one of two
reasons:
°
.
The plane encounters a series of problems that require flight
amendments and use up extra fuel. The solution to each
problem taken alone is quite reasonable, but, taken together,
fuel levels get unacceptably low. Thus, by failing to consider a
longer planning horizon, and by failing to anticipate potential
"worst case" possibilities, the crew ends up in a situation
where they have few good options left;
The crew "fixates" on their current plan too long, failing to
notice that their other options are disappearing (due to low
fuel). If the "worst case" arises and they can't complete their
current plan, they are in a difficult situation.
Plan Generation. Generally, a less serious error that occurs is the
failure of a crew to consider all of the alternatives available. In our
simulator studies, we frequently saw cases where crews found one
solution that was satisfactory and failed to even consider others that
might have proved superior.
Other Sources of Error. Other problems may arise due to "slips,"
failures to detect problems in a timely fashion and overreliance or
incorrect reliance on the computer.
Solutions. One solution would be to make the world "friendlier." The
obvious (but expensive) way to accomplish this would be to require
greater fuel reserves. A second would be to develop computer aids that
help the planner to use a longer planning horizon and to anticipate possible
"worst case" situations. A third would be to develop aids that monitor the
situation and warn the planner when the number of options is becoming
dangerously low. A fourth would be to facilitate distributed planning on
the assumption that Dispatch, for example, might be less likely to share a
fixation that the crew has developed (or vice versa).
To assist in problem detection and plan generation, the computer could use
both passive and active means. Displays can be designed that provide help
in detecting problems in a timely fashion are suggestive of alternative
plans that the crew might otherwise overlook. (Our detailed spreadsheet
is an example of this.) As an active assistant, the computer could also
monitor for problems and search for additional solutions, calling them to
the attention of the planners. Enhancing distributed planning would again
be an additional approach to improving performance.
"Slips" may be reduced by better design of the system, and their effects
perhaps reduced by asking the computer to critique performance.
Finally, the issue of overreliance or incorrect reliance on the computer is
an interesting one. One concern is the ability of the human planner to
understand what the computer is and is not considering, and to decide
appropriately whether to trust the computer's analysis. A second concern
is whether, even if the planner understands the functioning, he/she will
detect situations where the computer is operating outside of its intended
scope.
The studies we are planning with our testbed and with the Advanced Cab
should provide data to better understand the causes of such errors and the
effectiveness of alternative solutions.
Concept 14. Facilitate communication and cooperation by
designing a system that can infer the
planner's current goals.
In selecting a flight amendment to deal with some problem, the solution
space to be searched is often quite large. If the computer can determine
what the planner is trying to accomplish, it can begin this search on its
own.
One example of such aiding involves avoiding bad weather. Assume the
planner sketches a solution on the map display that creates a route south
of some storm activity. Given this input, the computer can infer the
planner's goal and automatically begin searching for alternative solutions
(e.g., going north of the storm, or flying above the storm). If a promising
alternative solution is found, this can be displayed to the planner for
consideration. (The planner might also want to view some (organized)
listing of the plans the computer has considered.)
Concept 15. Consider appropriate functional groupings to
facilitate important comparisons.
As part of our cognitive task analysis, we identified a variety of data and
information that pilots wanted to view, and comparisons they wanted to
make. In the Spreadsheet display we have attempted to group information
to facilitate such comparisons, supporting questions such as:
•2.
3.
Which plan will use up more fuel?
What is my ETA at Denver?
What is the jet route we will take between St. Louis and
Cincinatti?
Concept 16. Allow the planner to tailor the information
and data displays to fit his/her needs and
preferences.
On the one hand, it is plausible that different planners may prefer to
display different information at different times. This may increase their
acceptance of the computer aids and improve their ability to deal with
different circumstances.
On the other hand, the literature indicates that people don't always know
what the best design is, even for themselves. Thus, we must be cautious
in deciding what flexibility to provide to the system user.
Our testbed currently has one simple application of this concept. The
planner can select the combination of weather information that he/she
prefers to display at any given time.
Summary
Our Flight Planning Testbed allows us to explore a wide variety of design
concepts and principles that are important to the design of computer aids
in general, and to the design of aids for enroute flight planning in
particular. Above, we have described the prototyping environment we have
developed, and some specific implementations we have designed.
As discussed above, our studies of flight planning activities (through
simulations and interviews), and our work in implementing specific
concepts, have been very fruitful in identifying some very interesting
design concepts. Our preliminary tests of the system, for instance,
indicate that pilots view both the types of information provided and the
form of interaction to be very useful:
"Real-time [weather] is absolutely worthwhile .... The left screen
[would be] invaluable. [We] now lack big picture [in existing
systems]"
"[The left screen would be] invaluable in the cockpit. Absolutely."
"This is much easier to learn. [Pilots] could learn [this system]
faster with less training."
In particular, having a functional system has proved to be a very valuable
aid to stimulate ideas and discussion. This implementation should be
equally valuable in our next stage, in which we will empirically test these
design concepts and develop more detailed cognitive models.
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Abstract
This paper reviews various errors that have been described by comparing human be-
havior to the norms of probability, causal connection, and logical deduction. For each
error we review evidence on whether the error has been demonstrated to occur. For many
errors, the occurrence of a bias has not been demonstrated; for others errors a bias does
occur, but arguments can be made that the bias is not an error. Based on the conclusions
of this review, researchers and practitioners are cautioned in referring to well known biases
and errors.
Introduction
Whenever human performance is compared to a standard, the notion of error arises. A
simple list of the errors that humans make is not useful, but a coherent categorization of
errors occurring in different domains, under different conditions, and in different forms is
helpful.
A well-known categorization of errors is that of Tversky and Kahneman (1974); their
categorization involves two levels. First, they create categories of errors on the basis of
obvious groupings; for example, they classify together errors that involve ignoring base
rates. Second, they create categories by grouping together errors that they argue are
caused by the use of the same heuristic. For example, Tversky and Kahneman attribute
the errors involving ignoring base rate, as well as other errors, to the operation of the
representativeness heuristic; they attribute the occurrence of yet other errors to other
heuristics.
This paper is a review of the literature on specific categories of cognitive errors. The
categories are at the first level of Kahneman and Tversky. Thus, this paper is a catalog of
errors, not a catalog of explanations of errors.
Scope. The errors included in this catalog were selected because they have received
widespread attention by researchers and have been widely labeled as errors. The articles
reviewed under each error were selected to portray the history of research and the range
of thought regarding the error. Where possible the labels used in the original publication
were used to determine to which category of error a behavior was assigned.
This is not an exhaustive literature review. References are intended to include the
earliest source that labeled the error, studies that indicate the development of thought
about the error, and studies that indicate the agreements and disagreements regarding the
error. Since this is a catalog of errors, not a catalog of explanations of errors, discussions
of the cognitive processes causing the error are omitted.
Errors due to lack of domain knowledge by' a sllbject and errors that are specific to a
domain of discourse are omitted. Studies are included that use adult subjects, whether
novices or experts in the domain in which the error is being tested, but not studies using
only children as subjects.
Motivation. The study of human error has long been of interest to researchers and
practitioners. Our own interest arises from the desire the build computer systems that
critique practitioners or that teach students. Such systems must be able to detect and
diagnose errors and to provide effective remediation. In particular, the catalog is being
used to predict and classify errors made by immunohematologists (laboratory technicians
who analyze a patient's blood in order to provide matching blood for a transfusion) and
flight crewsof commercial aircraft.
This paper is also useful as a history of ideas in one area of cognitive research. The
errors in this catalog sharean underlying structure, especially in the norms against which
error is defined and in the developmentof ideasconcerning the various errors.
Itintorical trends. Typically, a particular type of behavior is identified by comparison
to a norm. Many of the errors in this paper are labeled by comparison with three norms
based on treating the subject as a naive scientist: norms based on probabilistic reasoning,
norms arising from the findings of science regarding causality, and norms developed from
deductive logic. An example of an error in probabilisti_: reasoning is conservatism in re-
vision of beliefs in the face of evidence. The fundamental attribution error is an example
of an error of causal reasoning since, contrary to scientific findings, subjects overempha-
size the role of personality as compared to the role of environment in causing a person's
behavior. An example of an error in deductive logic is the failure of subjects to name the
correct cases necessary for verification of a particular "if P, then Q" rule.
Many of these errors share a similar history. In the course of studying some task, a
researcher discovers that some subjects use a simplifying strategy. The strategy is only
a heuristic, and therefore it will occasionally lead to errors. Noting this, the researcher
devises a task on which the heuristic is likely to lead people astray and performs experi-
ments which demonstrate that a significant proportion of subjects do exhibit the error on
the task. Other researchers attempt to replicate the experiments and to perform similar
but slightly different experiments. Different results are observed by different researchers;
some successfully replicate the original results, while others find contradictory results. A
dispute follows concerning whether the error actually occurs; the debate usually changes
into efforts to describe the conditions under which the error occurs and the conditions un-
der which it does not occur. Sometimes researchers show that, while the error is common
under laboratory conditions, under realistic conditions the error occurs infrequently. Some
researchers argue that the heuristic is robust, that is, it is likely to give good results in
natural situations. Some researchers seek to discover what kind of training is necessary
to eliminate the error. Other researchers mount larger objections by objecting to labeling
the subjects' behavior as an error. Some argue that subjects misinterpret the task because
of linguistic ambiguities in instructions or because of expectations arising from the labo-
ratory situation. Others argue that subjects use proper probability reasoning, use proper
causal arguments, or are properly logical, but frame the problem differently from the way
intended by the researcher. In a more fundamental attack, others argue that subjects use
a logic or use concepts of probabilistic reasoning or causality different from the norms of
a scientist but still worthy of being called rational.
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Overview. Rarely is there a final consensus on any of these errors. Many of the disputes
mentioned in this generic history are still in process concerning some of the errors. Indeed,
even the fact of occurrence of some of the errors is still in dispute.
We begin with the errors that are labeled by comparison with the norms of probability.
Since information received in real-world situations is often insufficient to reach a conclusive
statement, people must be able to judge the proper weight to give to their knowledge and
to new information in arriving at degrees of belief. The first error discussed is that people
give judgmental probabilities that do not equal correct combinatorial probabilities or correct
empirical frequencies. This error can be viewed as evidence that people's internal degrees
of belief as expressed on a probability scale do not represent correct beliefs. More such
evidence is provided by the miscalibration of many people's probability estimates.
Other errors in probability are exhibited by noting that subjects' responses on several
questions do not have the numerical relationship to each other that they should have.
These errors mean that a subject's judgments are internally inconsistent. These errors
include insensitivity to sample size, committing conjunctive and disjunctive probability er-
rors, incorrectly revising probabilities, ignoring base rates, and exhibiting hindsight bias.
Next we discuss errors that crceur when people must judge the causal connection or the
co-occurrence of two events. Several attribution errors are described, including the funda-
mental attribution error and various egocentric biases. Two errors regarding probabilistic
dependencies are included: illusory correlation and reliance only on positive hit,_. The final
errors in this group are overprediction and the illusion of control.
Four errors involving logical deduction are covered. Incorrect testing of a conditional
rule and the confirmation bias both involve the incorrect selection by subjects of items with
which to test a theory. Differential treatment of positive and negative information involves
the inability to use negative information as efficiently as positive information. Hypothesis
fixation involves continuing to hold a hypothesis which has been disproved.
This review focuses on whether each error has been shown to occur. The conclusion is
that, for many of the errors, there is considerable doubt about whether the behavior occurs
frequently. Furthermore, even if the behavior has been shown to occur, there is consider-
able disagreement over whether it should be labeled an error. Therefore, researchers and
practitioners should be cautious in referring to certain biases as if their existence is well
established or in referring to those biases as errors.
Judgmental probabilities don't equal corresponding empirical frequencies
Definition. People's probability judganents differ from the corresponding combinatorial
probabilities or from the corresponding empirical frequencies.
In a variety of experiments, subjects have been asked to express their beliefs regarding
the likelihood of events in the form of probabilities. The experimenter provides no infor-
mation or evidence to the subject. The quality of the subject's answer thus depends on
his knowledge and on his ability to express his belief in the form of a probability. Gener-
ally, it is easy to show that the probabilities given by subjects often do not match beliefs
that should be arrived at through combinatorial calculations or through observation of
evidence.
The birthday problem is often used to show that intuition regarding combinatorial
probabilities is poor. Among a group of only 23 people, the odds favor the occurrence of
identical birthdays, a result counter to most people's intuition. Similarly, people generally
believe that more 2-member committees than 8-member committees can be formed from
l0 people, while the correct answer is that the same number of such committees can be
formed (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974).
People also give probabilities that disagree with data on past occurrences. Extensive
comparisons have been made between people's judgments of the number of deaths per
year from various sources and public health statistics. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein
(1980) summarized these studies: "[W]hile more likely hazards generally evoked higher
estimates, ... [i]n general, rare causes of death were overestimated and common causes
of death were underestimated." People also seem to see patterns in series of events that
are actually random sequences, as summarized in the phrase "gambler's fallacy." Gilovich,
Vallone, and Tversky (1985), for example, found that people believe in streaks in basketball
shooting, when, in fact, the data show that the sequences are essentially random.
$hanteau (1978) argued that results showing the operation of such biases illustrate
only how people make probability estimates about events for which they lack direct knowl-
edge. There is some evidence that substantive knowledge improves probability judgments.
Shanteau (1978) pointed out that experiments on subjects' perceptions of word frequencies
and occupation frequencies showed less bias; presumably subjects have more direct experi-
ence with these categories than with public health data. J. Christensen-Szalanski, Beck, C.
Christensen-Szalanski, and Koepsell (1983) found that while physicians overestimated the
mortality rates of various diseases, with a median overestimation of 150_, the physicians
were substantially more accurate than the judgments of college undergraduates, who had
a median percentage error of 2.583_.
One way to control for subjects' substantive knowledge is to provide them with the
experience on which they are to assess a probability. Sheridan and Ferrell (1974) summa-
rized experiments by various researchers and concluded that: "A variety of experiments
point strongly to the conclusion that people are, on the average at least, good transducers
of relative frequency and proportion from observed events. Furthermore, they can even
describe the stimuli accurately by assigning numerical probability values." They also com-
ment that little leaxning seems to occur over repeated trials, implying that this is a task
subjects already know how to do.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) (as well as others) have pointed out the problem with label-
ing as errors any discrepancies between probabilities and frequencies: "[I]n the Bayesian
framework subjective probabilities represent statements of persona belief and therefore
have no objective referent."
Summary. It is difficult to argue that people should, on their own, know results con-
cerning combinatorial probal_ilities that are usually the subject of specialized instruction
at the college level. Furthermore, no evidence has been presented that such results are
particularly useful for reA-world decisions and thus should have been learned through ex-
perience. It is similarly unclear that subjects should be expected to know public health
statistics.
A consensus seems to be emerging that these discrepancies should not be called errors,
but that the discrepancies do have patterns and thus can be described as a bias, that is,
a tendency to provide estimates that do not average to the true value, but which have
a systematic deviation. There is some evidence that the bias is reduced by substantive
knowledge.
In an effort to test probability judg'rnents without using an objective reference and
without simultaneously testing the subject's substantive knowledge, experimenters have
used the idea of calibration.
Miscalibration
Definition. "If a person assesses the probability of a proposition being true as .7 and
later finds that the proposition is false, that in itself does not invalidate the assessment.
However, if a judge assigns .7 to 10,000 independent propositions, only 25 of which sub-
sequently are found to be true, there is something wrong with these assessments. The
attribute that they lack is called calibration ... " (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips,
1982). Adams (1957) seems to be the original source for this concept.
Early history. Many calibration studies have been performed. Lichtenstein st al. (1982)
summarized the results: "The most pervasive finding in recent research is that people are
overconfident with generA-knowledge items of moderate or extreme difficulty." These are
questions such as "Which magazine had the largest circulation in 1970, Playboy or Time?"
in which the subject selects an answer and then gives his probability that his selected
answer is correct. Overconfidence is highest for very difficult tasks and decreases as tasks
get easier. While weather forecasters have been found to be well calibrated {Murphy and
Winkler, 1984), the calibration of physicians is poor (Christensen-Szalanski and Bushy-
head, 1981). Some studies have found good calibration on future events, while others
have found overconfidence in this situation also (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Fischhoff and
MacGregor (1982) concluded "calibration for confidence assessments regarding forecasts is
largely indistinguishable from that pertaining to general knowledge questions."
In a series of experiments, Howell (1971, 1972) found overconfidence for what he calls
internal probabilities, that is, probabilities concerning events arising from the person's
own behavior (for example, hitting a target with a dart). Vertinsky, Kanetkar, Vertinsky,
and Wilson (1986), however, found that the members of a field hockey team were well
calibrated in giving probabilities for outcomes of games.
Efforts to improve subjects' calibration by increasing their motivation or by cautioning
them did not seem to have an effect (Lichtenstein et al., 1982), but asking subjects to
provide reasons why their answer might be wrong did seem to help (Koriat et al., 1980).
Arkes, Christensen, Lai, and Blumer (1987) found that less direct methods such as simply
providing feedback or having subjects anticipate a group discussion of their answers also
reduced overconfidence.
Hypothesis fixation (discussed elsewhere in this paper) can be viewed as overconfi-
dence in the probability that one's hypothesis is correct. Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichten-
stein (1978), Mehle, Gettys, Manning, Baca, and Fisher (1981), and Mehle (1982) found
that subjects exhibited overconfidence in the completeness of the set of hypotheses they
considered.
Summary. While calibration is meant to measure a subject's ability to give probabilities
apart from his substantive knowledge, there is some evidence that calibration improves
with increased knowledge. Lichtenstein et al. (1982) found that calibration was better on
easier questions: weather forecasters are well calibrated; the field hockey players were well
calibrated on their own abilities. Counter evidence is provided by the poor calibration
of physicians. Again, it is unclear whether subjects provide poor probabilities because of
cognitive error or because of lack of substantive knowledge. As with incorrect probabilities,
it may be that overconfidence occurs mostly when the subject lacks substantive knowledge.
Subjects' understanding of reasoning under uncertainty can also be tested by their
ability to provide probabilities that are in the correct logical relationship to each other.
rn the next two errors, people's probability judgments are not sensitive to sample size and
do not follow rules of set intersection and union.
Insensitivity to sample size
Definition. The law of large numbers implies that the probability of seeing an extreme
result decreases as the size of the sample increases, but subjects often fail to use this fact.
Early hi_tory. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that ;'when subjects assessed
the distributions of averageheight for samplesof various sizes, they produced identical
distributions. For example, the probability of obtaining an averageheight greater than 6
feet wasassignedthe samevalue for samplesof 1000, 100,and 10 men."
However, Petersonand Beach (1967) earlier summarized experiments that imply that
subjects are sensitive to sample size in some questions. The subjects were not asked for
probabilities but instead for their confidence in their conclusions. "Data that vary along
a dimension are sampled from one of two populations, and subjects decide from which of
the two populations the data have been drawn .... In both experiments [of Irwin, Smith,
and Mayfield, 1956], confidence increased with the size of the sample ..... Little and Lintz
(1965) performed a similar experiment and found that on a trial-by trim basis, confidence
increased with sample size."
Later hi_tory. Evans and Dusoir (1977) found considerable individual variability in the
use of sample size. They also found that simplifying the problem increased the fraction of
subjects giving correct answers. Kahneman and Tversky's (1972) version of one problem
was:
"A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born
each day and in the smaller about 15 babies axe born each day. As you know, about 50%
of all babies are boys. The exact percentage of baby boys, however, varies from day to
day. Sometimes it may be higher than 50%, sometimes lower.
"For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60% of the
babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such days?"
With Kahneman and Tversky's version, Evans and Dusoir found that 11 out of 20 subjects
gave the correct answer. With the following simplified second paragraph:
"Which hospital do you think is more likely to find on one day that more than 60% of the
babies born were boys?"
14 out of 20 subjects gave correct answer. With this simplified second paragraph:
"Which hospital do you think is more likely to find on most days recorded in a year that
all the babies born were boys?"
17 out of 20 subjects gave the correct answer. With both simplifications, that is:
"Which hospital do you think is more likely to find on one day that all the babies born
were boys?"
again, 17 out of 20 gave the correct answer. Evans and Dusoir pointed out that the original
version requires subjects to assess a compound event with repeated trials, which introduces
more complexity.
Bar-Hillel (1979) made similar modifications to some of Kahneman and Tversky's
(1972) questions and found that subjects did better. In other experiments, she also found,
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as Petersonand Beachreported, that confidenceincreasedwith samplesize.
While Bar-Hillel noted that people are sensitive to sample size, she reported results
based on subjects' rank ordering of their confidence in various surveys to support her
hypothesis that they do so on the basis of the ratio of the sizeof the sample to the size
of the population, which may not alwaysbe an appropriate method. Bar-HiLlel concluded
"[w]hile there still remains the problem of convincing people that it is absolute rather
than relative sample sizewhich typically determinesa sample's worth, people'sintuitions
regarding the role of sample size in sample evaluation may not be as discouraging as
previously thought."
Fischhoff et al. (1979) performed similar experiments in a within-subjects, rather
than between-subjects framework, to see if this would draw the subjects' attention to the
importance of sample size. Unlike the results with base rates and with overprediction
(reported later), this manipulation did not cause subjects' responses to vary with sample
size.
Summary. In simple questions many subjects do seem to be appropriately sensitive to
sample size. They seem to be aware of the fact that confidence should increase more with
a larger sample and thus do'nt_t seem to generally make any cognitive error. If subjects do
make such an error in more complicated questions it may be due to other cognitive errors
than a lack of understanding of the effect of sample size.
Conjunctions and disjunctions
Definition. Two errors in the estimation of probabilities are discussed here. The first
is the overestimation of the probability of a conjunctive event, that is, an event such as
drawing a red marble in all draws of seven successive draws from a bag containing red and
white marbles. The second error is the underestimation of the probability of a disjunctive
event, that is, an event such as drawing a red marble in at least one draw of seven successive
draws from a bag containing red and white marbles. Both examples are from Bar-HiLlet
(1973).
Early MJtory. Evidence for these errors is provided by subjects' choices between bets.
Bar-Hillel (1973) found that in pairwise choices between bets, many subjects chose to bet
on a simple event (that had probability .500 of winning) rather than to bet on a disjunctive
event that had higher probability (.522); many subjects also chose to bet on a conjunctive
event (.478) rather than to bet on a simple event with higher probability (.500). Slovic
(1969) reported similar results and reviewed earlier work by Cohen and Hansel (1958).
Other experimenters asked subjects only to rank statements by likelihood. A conjunc-
tive fallacy is said to have occurred when a subject ranks as more likely a compound event
than a component of the event (Yates and Carleson, 1986). For example, subjects Were
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given the following description:
"Linda is 31 yearsold, single, outspoken and very bright. Shemajored in philosophy. As
a student, she wasdeeply concernedwith issuesof discrimination and social justice, and
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations."
Many subjects then ranked the statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the fem-
inist movement" as more likely than the statement "'Linda is a bank teller" (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1982). Yates and Carlson found conjunction fallacy rates of 29.5% to 70.5_,
with the lowest rate occurring in abstract forms of the problem.
Later hi._tory.._Iarkus and Zajonc (1985) suggested that people may be misinterpreting
sentences such as "Linda is a bank teller" to mean "Linda is a bank teller and not active
in the feminist movement" because of the presence of the alternative "Linda is a bank
teller and is active in the feminist movement". Morier and Borgida (1984) found that
explicitly including the statement "'Linda is a bank teller who is not a feminist" in the
list of statements to be ranked reduced the percentage of subjects making the conjunctive
error. Evidence against this explanation is provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1983) in
a study showing that physicians committed the conjunction fallacy. In a separate question
the physicians said they were interpreting symptoms as being among the symptoms (not
the only symptoms) the patient had, implying that their incorrect judgment was not due
to misinterpretation of the statements. However, one must always be careful when using
a subject's explanation of his thinking as evidence of his actual cognitive processes.
Tversky and Ka.hneman (1983) reported that "the conjunction of an unlikely symp-
tom with a likely one was [incorrectly] judged more probable than the less likely con-
stituent" alone. Similarly, Wells (1985) found that the conjunction fallacy occurred with
high frequency only if a representative event (for example, "'Linda is active in the feminist
movement," which is perceived to match the given description of Linda) is added to an
unrepresentative event (for example, "Linda is a bank teller," which is perceived not to
match the description).
Summary. As with earlier errors, it seems that subjects cannot intuitively compute
correct combinatorial probabilities, but this is again hard to label a cognitive error. How-
ever, the conjunction fallacy, that is, the incorrect ranking of two statements, does seem
to be a cognitive error by subjects. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) attribute the conjunc-
tion fallacy to the operation of the representativeness heuristic, that is, subjects assess the
likelihood of a statement by its degree of correspondence with a model, in the example,
a model of Linda. _Iore specifically, subjects may be assessing the probability that Linda
would have the given description under the various possible answers. They are respond-
ing correctly that the description of Linda is more likely if the subject knows Linda is
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a bank teller and active in the feminist movement than if the subject knows only that
she is a bank teller. However, subjects are responding to the wrong questiom since they
have reversed the order of conditioning. This explanation still leaves open why subjects
sometimes reverse the order of conditioning and sometimes don't.
The Linda question differs from previously cited experiments in that the experimenter
provides information to the subject, in this case a description of Linda, and asks the subject
to give probabilities after using the information. Other experiments have looked even more
explicitly at subjects' use of information provided to them.
Incorrect revision of probabilities
Definition. Evaluated against Bayesian revision of probabilities, people tend to make
two errors: failing to revise probabilities enough when data are processed simultaneously,
and, conversely, revising probabilities too much when data a.re processed sequentially.
The following example (from Edwards, 1968) illustrates conservatism. A coin is flipped
to select one of two bookbags, either predominantly red (700 red poker chips and 300
blue) or predominantly blue (700 blue and 300 red). After observing that in a set of 12
chips, selected randomly with replacement, 8 are reds and 4 are blues, one can use Bayes's
theorem to calculate that tb.e probability that the predominantly red bag was selected has
increased to .97 due to the data. However, subjects typically estimate probabilities in the
range .7 to .8.
Early hi._tory. In 1968, Edwards summarized the results of several studies on conser-
vatism. "An abundance of research has shown ... that opinion change is very orderly, and
usually proportional to numbers calculated from Bayes's theorem - but it is insufficient
in amount." Alker and Hermann (1971) replicated the results with other versions of the
problem and found that "subjects were more conservative as the decisions to be made
became more lifelike in nature."
Evidence is mixed, but seems to indicate that training helps to reduce conservatism.
"Peterson, DuCharme, and Edwards (1968) ... found that conservatism in a book-bag-
and-poker-chip task was only slightly reduced by training [subjects] in the sampling dis-
tribution. Wheeler and Beach (1968), on the other hand, found a sharp reduction in
conservatism after training [subjects] by having them place bets on the source of the sam-
ple and then giving feedback on the correct urn" (Messick and Campos, 1972). Messick
and Campos found that training in both the sampling distribution and the posterior dis-
tribution helped reduce, but not eliminate, conservatism.
In contrast to conservative single-stage inference, most studies of multi-stage inference
have shown that subjects are radical in their revision of opinions.
Later history. Navon (1979, 1981) argued that in many real-world situations data are
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not independent. Furthermore, hearguedthat conservatismis called for in situations where
data axecorrelated in a way that is likely in real-world situations. For example, among
income, education, and social class, each.pair is positively correlated. If one is trying to
infer the social classof a person from data about income and education, the secondpiece
of data should be discounted somewhat, that is, the observer should be conservative in
revision of probabilities relative to the assumptionof independenceof data.
Summary. The correct probabilistic inference to draw from data depends on one's
model of the process that generated the data. It is unclear whether subjects use a different
model from the experimenter or make an error in inference. In either case, they have made
an error under the experimental conditions, but their incorrect model, which assumes
dependence of data, may often be correct in real world situations.
Bayes's theorem is also the standard for defining the next error.
Ignoring base rates
Definition. In many situations involving probabilistic inferences, two types of infor-
mation are relevant: base rate information about the characteristics of the population at
large, and specific information about an individual from that population. In statistical
inference, both types of information should be considered, since the specific information
leads to only probabilistic, not definitive statements about an individual. However, many
subjects ignore base rate information in making probabilistic statements about an individ-
ual drawn from a population; equivalently, they place too much emphasis on the particular
information about the individual.
Early hi_tory. Kahneman and Tversky (1973} reported on several experiments which
illustrate this error. In one experiment, each subject was told that psychologists had
interviewed 30 engineers and 70 lawyers and created 100 thumbnail descriptions of them.
The subject was told that one description had been picked at random and he was to
"indicate your probability that each person described is an engineer, on a scale from 0 to
100." Another group was given the same instructions, but was told that the description had
been randomly selected from a group of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers. Both groups were also
asked to give probabilities assuming they had no description of the individual. Kahneman
and Tversky found "that explicit manipulation of the prior distribution had a minimal
effect on subjective probability," although subjects did use the prior probabilities correctly
when they were given no description. On the other hand, when given a description which
was basically uninformative, the median response was .5, regardless of priors.
Another widely cited example in which subjects ignore base rates is the cab problem.
"A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green
and the Blue, operate in the city. You are given the following data:
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a. 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue.
b. A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the witness
under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident and concluded tb.at
the witness correctly identified each one of the two colors 80% of the time and failed _00%
of the time.
What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue rather than Green?"
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1982).
Applying Bayes's theorem leads to a probability of .41. However, Tversky and Kahneman
(1982) found that "It]he median and modal answer [of subjects] is typically .8, a value
which coincides with the credibility of the witness and is apparently unaffected by the
relative frequency of Blue and Green cabs."
Late," history. Lyon and Slovic (1976) used a light bulb problem which "takes the
situation out of a court of law, employs a 'mechanical witness', emphasizes random selection
from the population, and presents the individuating information in the same form as the
base rate is given, i.e., as a percentage." Lyon and Slovic report that "the change in
cover story provided by the Light-Bulb problem ... had little effect on the use of base-
rate information." The median estimate "continued to match the stated accuracy levels
regardless of whether the accuracy was 80e_, 50%, or 20%." Several authors have pointed
out that subjects' answers showed more variation in the light bulb problem than in the
cab problem. The correct answer in the cab problem is 41%; the median answer was 80°_
with interquartile range 60-80%. The correct answer in the light bulb problem was also
41%: again the median estimate was 80% but with interquartile range 25-80%. This may
indicate that while the median answer was still non-Bayesian, more subjects were using
the base rate information.
Bar-HiUel (1983) pointed out that the error is quite common even in professional judg-
ments. "[A]ccording to Dershkowitz (1971), Eddy (1982), Foltz and Kelsey (1978) and
Lykken (1975), to cite but a few, this fallacy is still prevalent in such important areas
of jud_-nent and decision making as preventive detention, mammography, Pap smears,
and lie detection, respectively." Using some of the standard questions (for example, the
cab problem) as well as medical examples, Borak and Veilleux (1982) found the error in
physicians' judgments, but the rate decreased with statistical training and with experience.
Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981) found opposite evidence concerning physi-
cians.
"Since base-rate information is necessary to calculate predictive value, the significant pos-
itive correlation between a symptom's actual predictive value for pneumonia and that
obtained from the physician's estimate of a patient's probability of pneumonia suggests
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that physiciansdo usebase-rate information. These results may not be surprising to any-
one who hasheard his or her physician say,'You probably have .... There's a lot of that
going around now.' Sucha statement implies the useof base-rate information."
Wallsten (1983) summarizedresearchon when baserates are used: "thus far at least three
factors have been identified that affect their use. These are (i) expertise of the judge, (ii)
relevance or specificity of the information, and (iii) salience of the information." Bar-Hillel
(1983) listed several factors that enhance the impact of base rates: a causal relation be-
tween the population data and the individual; specificity of the base rate; and vividness
of the base rate. Group discussion and estimation of the probability seems to accentuate
the effect, not reduce it (Argote, Seabright, and Dyer, 1986).
Some authors have argued that subjects ignore base rates because they interpret lan-
guage in a way different from that intended by the experimenters. Adler (1983) cited
Grice's (1975) theory that conversation relies on cooperativeness between listener and
speaker. "In one base-rate study, the experimenter's most salient contribution is a bio-
graphical sketch; this will be of greater selective relevance to the judgment requested if
subjects judge on the basis of its diagnostic qualities rather than (less cooperatively) inte-
grating it with the base-rat_ aata" (Adler, 1983). Misinterpretation can possibly explain
the results from the lightbulb problem; Spielman (1983) argued that subjects' error may
lie in interpreting the word "random" to mean that defective and nondefective bulbs are
equally likely to be chosen. Given this incorrect assumption, the correct answer is the base
rate.
Birnbaum (1983) argued that the usual analysis of the problem requires that the ob-
server's accuracy (.8) not vary. with the base rate, but that signal detection theory implies
that it should. The accuracy rate determined by the court, .8, presumably used equal
numbers of each type of cab, while the city conditions have only 15% blue cabs. Birn-
baum concluded that "the modal response of .8 by untrained subjects may be closer to
the best normative solution than the value of .41 used in previous research." Birnbaum
applied similar analysis to the light bulb and lawyer/engineer problems. He commented,
for example, that a report of mathematical interest "'may be highly diagnostic of a rare
engineer in a population consisting mostly of lawyers," but have little diagnostic meaning
in a population consisting mostly of engineers.
Cohen (1979) mounted a more fundamental objection, arguing that subjects may be
performing a perfectly valid reasoning process even though it does not conform to standard
probability. A rationality closer to forensic proof argues for ignoring base-rate information.
"'Imagine a rodeo into which 400 people are known to have been admitted through an
automatic turnstile after paying the proper sum. Then 1,000 people are counted on the
15
seats, and a hole is discovered in the fence. A man is picked at random from the seats, who
turns out to be John Smith. That is all the evidence before the court when John Smith is
sued by the management of the rodeo for non-payment of his entry-money."
Cohen contrasted traditional Baconian probability with Pascalian probability which is
concerned with the degree to which an assertion has been proven by the facts. In Cohen
(1981) he again argued that subjects may be justified in ignoring the 85/15 base rate and
using the the 50/50 rate instead even in a disease example which does not have a judicial
setting.
The commentators on Cohen's 1981 article saw considerable problems with his analysis,
but many agreed that the choice of priors is crucial. For example, Levi (1981) argued that,
in the absence of information regarding the percentage of blue and green cabs in accidents,
subjects could reasonably assume equal numbers are in accidents, thus leading to the
correct conclusion of a .8 probability. Furthermore, he noted: "Kahneman and Tversky
have reported on variants of the taxicab experiment. According to one variant, the subjects
are told that 85% of the taxicabs involved in accidents are blue and the remainder green.
In that case, the subjects do not neglect base rates" (Levi, 1981).
Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) also emphasized the question of selecting an appropriate
prior. They noted that '% base rate can only be defined conditional on some population
(or sample space)" and they argued that "there is no generally accepted normative way
of defining the appropriate population." For example, "consider an inference concerning
whether someone has a particular propensity to heart disease. What is the relevant pop-
ulation to which this person should be compared? The population of people in the same
age group? The population of the United States? Of Mexico?"
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1979) converted some of these experiments from
a between-subjects design to a within-subjects design. Using the cab problem and the
light-bulb problem, an average of 16% of the respondents always answered .8 (that is
they completely ignored the base rate), an average of 10_ always answered with the base
rate, an average of 63% gave answers that were ordered according to the base rate, and
the remainder had other patterns of responses. They commented "It]he robust finding of
these studies is that most people know (or guess) the direction in which base rates should
influence their judgments," but they do not adjust enough for the base rate.
Some authors have argued that the error has not been demonstrated. Birnbaum and
Mellers (1983) gave "'three reasons for a skeptic to doubt the claim that humans neglect
base rate." First, the empirical evidence is inconsistent; the effect does not appear with
certain versions of the problems and, as shown by Fischhoff et al. (1979) and by Birnbaum
and Mellers themselves, the effect does not appear in within-subject designs. Second, the
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use of many subjects "assumes that the mapping from subjective values to overt responses
is the same for all subjects .... " Third, vagueness in the problems allows "several rational
solutions, depending on how the subject interprets the problem."
Summary. While there is evidence that some subjects do not use base rate information
as efficiently as they could, there is also strong evidence that base rate information is used
under some circumstances. Furthermore, there are reasonable arguments that even sub-
jects who completely ignore base rates may not be committing an error. Again is it unclear
whether subjects use the same model of the process as that used by the experimenter.
The next error also relates to the issue of whether people draw correct inferences from
information.
Hindsight bias
Definition. Telling subjects the outcome of an event increases their po_t hoc estimate of
the probability of that outcome, without the subject being aware that this has happened.
Early hi_tory. Fischhoff (1975) originated research in this area. In one experiment,
he asked subjects to read a passage describing historical events in Nepal and then to give
probabilities for four possible outcomes. Half the subjects were also told the actual outcome
before they were asked to provide the probabilities. "[R]eporting an outcome's occurrence
approximately doubles its perceived likelihood of occurrence" averaged across subjects and
questions. Even when told to report probabilities as if they did.n't know the true outcome,
subjects' probabilities were affected by reported outcome. Experiments also showed that,
'2 weeks to 6 months later, subjects "remembered having given higher probabilities than
they actually had to events believed to have occurred and lower probabilities to events
that hadn't occurred."
Later history. The bias seems to be robust. "Attempts to undo this knew-it-all-
along effect by exhorting subjects to work harder or telling them about the bias failed'
(Fischhoff, 1977). Wood (1978) found that other manipulations also failed to eliminate
the bias. However, Arkes, Faust, Gull.metre, and Hart (1988) successfully reduced the bias
using a method that reduces overconfidence: asking subjects "to provide a reason why
each of the other diagnoses might have been correct."
Some authors argue that the bias is only of concern for historians. As yon Winterfeldt
and Edwards (1986) stated. "[o]f all the cognitive illusions, the hindsight illusions would
seem to be the easiest to correct: one simply writes down the probability estimate before the
event occurs, or before the estimator learns the answer." However, Fischhoff (1975) argued
that this bias has deleterious effects on judgments. As a result of their changed perceptions,
subjects "overestimated what they would have known without outcome knowledge ..., as
well as what others ... actually did know without outcome knowledge. It is argued that
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this lack of awarenesscan seriously restrict one's ability to judge or learn from the past."
Healsofound that "[r]eporting an outcome's occurrence alters the judged relevance of data
describing the situation preceding the event."
Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, and Harkness (1981) found that physicians exhibit hindsight
bias. "Thirty-eight out of 60 hindsight subjects gave higher probability estimates to the
known-to-have-occurred diagnosis than the corresponding probability estimate obtained
for the foresight group .... " They also noted: "However, the bias was restricted to the
two diagnoses assigned the lowest probability estimates by the foresight group." "This
result replicates tKe findings of Fischhoff (1977) and Wood (1978) who found that the
hindsight bias is strongest for those events initially judged to be least plausible." Dawson,
Arkes, Sicilian, Blinkhorn, Lakshamanan, and Petrelli (1988) also found a hindsight bias
among physicians who were attending clinicopathologic conferences, except among more
experienced physicians who were estimating probabilities for more difficult cases.
Summary. The effect does seem to occur in a number of situations, but its practical
significance has been questioned. At first glance, the task of retrospectively estimating
one's probabilities would seem to have little relevance to real-world situations. However,
Fischhoff has raised concern about the implications of these results for the ability of people
to learn from case histories. The lesson would be that teachers should be careful to
present evidence first, asking students to draw conclusions and state their confidence,
before revealing the correct solution. In real-world situations, of course, information may
not be presented in such an order.
The next set of errors involves errors in assessing the degree of relationship (causal or
statistical) between events.
Attribution errors
Definition. Attribution theory involves studying the causes people give for their own be-
havior and for other people's behavior. Two errors are specific to the context of explaining
human action, the fundamental attribution error and egocentric bias. Ross and Anderson
(1982) describe the fundamental attribution error as "the tendency for attributers to un-
derestimate the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositionM
factors in controlling behavior." The label egocentric bias has been used for several errors.
Early hiatory. Ross and his colleagues have performed many experiments on errors in
attribution, demonstrating the occurrence of the fundamental attribution error. For exam-
ple, in experiments by Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977) participants were arbitrarily
assigned the roles of questioner and answerer; even observers who knew that the assign-
ments were arbitrary attributed more knowledge to the questioners than to the answerers.
Other researchers have shown similar effects.
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The rate of occurrenceof the fundamental attribution error dependson whether the
attributer is explaining his own or another's actions. Jones and Nisbett (1971) proposed
that _'there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational
requirements, whereasobserverstend to attribute the same actions to stable personal
dispositions." Kelley and Michela (1980) summarized researchon this topic: "[t]he pre-
ponderanceof studiesconfirms Jones& Nisbett's ... hypothesis: actors tend to makemore
situational attributions and observers,more dispositional ones."
A secondcategoryof attribution errors, the egocentricbias, hasbeenapplied to several
behaviors. Thompson and Kelley (1981) described one egocentric bias:
"When partners in a relationship judge the extent of their contribution to an activity,
each one tends to claim more responsibility for the event than the other is willing to
attribute to them. This phenomenon ... was first identified by Ross and Sicoly (1979) who
demonstrated that egocentric biases occur in a variety of relationships, including marital
couples, basketball teams, and temporary dyads in the laboratory."
Ross, Greene, and House (1977) also discussed the egocentric attribution or false consensus
bias: "people's tendency ... to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively
common and appropriate to existing circumstances while viewing alternative responses as
uncommon, deviant, and inappropriate." Elstein and Van Pelt (1969) found this effect in
the perception of psychiatric patients by hospital staff: "almost without exception, each
member of the staff says in effect that other staff see the patient the same way that he
does when, in fact, the real similarity correlations show otherwise."
Finally, the self-serving bias, is the tendency of people "to attribute their own success
to internal factors and to blame external factors for their failures" (Kruglanski and Ajzen,
1983). Many studies have shown this effect (see, for example, Weary Bradley, 1978, and
Miller, 1976).
Later hi_tory. Some researchers have questioned whether attribution errors should be
called errors. Harvey and Weary (1984) summarized these objections:
"The issues raised in this controversy include: (a) what questions research subjects think
they are answering'in studies purporting to show the working of the fundamental attri-
bution error (Hamilton 1980); (b) what criteria to use in establishing the accuracy of
attribution (Harvey, Town, and Yarkin 1981); (c) whether under certain conditions over-
attribution to situational factors also may represent incorrect judgment (Harvey et al.
1981); and (d) the idea that an important difference between situational and dispositional
attributions is level of analysis; that is, situational attributions describe environmental
circumstances associated with behavior, while dispositional attributions are intended to
describe how a given action fits into the larger pattern of the actor's behavior over time
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(Funder, 1982)."
Miller and Ross(1975) and Markus and Zajonc (1985) raised similar objections.
Summary. In attribution experiments, subjects are asked to function as amateur psy-
chologists; it is not surprising that their intuitive judgments do not always agree with
the findings established by psychologists. For example, subjects and observers in the ex-
periment of Ross et al., tended to be affected by the advantage conferred by the role of
questioner. It would take a sophisticated subject or observer to recognize that such an
effect might be operating, to reason that such an effect might be inappropriate in the
situation of arbitrarily assigned roles, and finally to correct for the effect. In fact, in most
real-world situations, evidence suggesting the superior ability of another person should lead
to a revision of opinion.
The next error involves assessing statistical dependencies from data.
Learning probabilistic dependencies
In a real world situation a person may need to judge how often the occurrence and
nonoccurrence of two events have been associated in order to decide whether one event
can be used as an indication of the other event. Several errors appear in subjects' learning
of such probabilistic depenc[ehcies. We discuss two here, illusory correlation and reliance
only on positive hits. The first is the perception of positive correlation where none actually
exists. The second is the estimation of association based only on the number of cases where
both events occur.
Definztior_. Chapman (1967) proposed the term illusory correlation "for the report
by observers of a correlation between two classes of events which, in reality, (a) are not
correlated, or (b) are correlated to a lesser extent than reported, or (c) are correlated in
the opposite direction from that which is reported."
Early hi_tory. Chapman presented subjects with pairs of words and then asked for an
estimate of how often particular words were paired. Subjects tended to overestimate the
co-occurrence of word pairs with "high associative connection," for example, hat and head.
The amount of illusory correlation declined with repeated testing.
In a more realistic setting, Chapman and Chapman (1967 and 1969) found the effect in
the association of clinical symptoms and diagnoses with naive subjects and with practicing
psychodiagnosticians. Both groups tended to see a relationship between male homosex-
uality and the person's answers on DAP (Draw-a-Person) tests or on Wheeler-Rorschach
cards. "The reported relationships corresponded to rated associative strength between
symptom and drawing characteristic" (Chapman and Chapman, 1967). "'[The] popular
invalid signs were found to have much stronger rated, verbal associative connections to
male homosexuality than the unpopular valid signs" (Chapman and Chapman, 1969).
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Later history. Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) reviewed the literature on illusory corre-
lation and concluded: "Our examination of the work on humans' covariation detection
abilities demonstrates that under some conditions, people detect event contingencies accu-
rately." Similarly, Kunda and Nisbett (1986) examined the conditions under which illusory
correlation occurs. They "found substantial accuracy for correlation estimates if two con-
ditions were met: (1) subjects were highly familiar with the data in question and (2) the
data were highly 'codable', that is, capable of being unitized and interpreted clearly ....
Subjects were particularly inaccurate about correlations involving social behavior: They
severely overestimated the stability of behavior across occasions."
In all of these experiments subjects were asked to estimate a relationship only from
the data presented to them, that is, to ignore any prior beliefs they had concerning the
relationship. This may be difficult for subjects to do and indeed, a Bayesian analysis says
that they should not ignore prior beliefs but should revise them in light of the evidence.
Golding and Rorer (1972) replicated Chapman and Chapman's 1969 study, but asked
subjects for estimates of the relationships between cues and hypotheses both before and
after exposure to training materials. They found that subjects did substantially revise their
probability estimates of relationships in light of the evidence, although "the posttraining
levels were still considerably biased, in an absolute sense, indicating that, while the bias
was modifiable, it was still relatively resistant to change."
Summary. Naive subjects are likely to rely on unconscious or conscious prior asso-
ciations in order to assess co-occurrence of events. In a real-world situation, it may be
appropriate to use such prior beliefs and therefore subjects find it difficult to ignore these
prior associations, even when instructed to do so.
Definition. The error of looking only at positive hits can be explained by the following
table:
B not-B
A a b
not-A c d
where A and not-A represent the occurrence or nonoccurrence of event A, B and not-B
represent the occurrence or nonoccurrence of event B, and a, b, c, and d represent the
number of cases in each cell. The ability to predict B from A depends on there being a
difference between a/(a +b) and c/(c +d). The error described here involves using only the
magnitude of a to judge the relationship between events A and B.
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Early hi_tory. Smedslund (1963) asked student nurses to estimate the relationship
between a symptom and diagnosis by viewing a pack of 100 cards containing symptom
and diagnosis pairs. He concluded: "Their strategies and inferences typically reveal a
particularistic, non-statistical approach, or an exclusive dependence on the frequency of
[positive symptom and positive diagnosis] instances." The subjects tended to estimate a
large relationship between A and B when the value of a in the above table was high,
regardless of the values of b, c, and d. Subjects were not presented with the summary
table.
Jenkins and Ward (1965) asked subjects to judge the strength of a relationship by
saying how much control they thought they had over which of two outcomes would occur.
"The main finding of these experiments is that the amount of judged control was a function
of the frequency of successful outcomes rather than of the actual dependency of outcomes
upon response." The authors were aware of the difficulty of using control as a surrogate for
the concept of contingency. Ward and Jenkins (1965) asked subjects to use data to judge
"'the degree of control over rainfall exerted by seeding." Subjects who received trial-by-trial
data (with or without a later summary table being presented) made poorer judgments than
those who received only the summary table. Of 22 subjects who saw only the summary
table, 18 seemed to be basing their judgments appropriately on the difference in the ratios
a/(a +b) and c/(c+d). However, "[t]hose who receive information on a trim by trim basis,
as it usually occurs in the real world, generally fail to assess adequately the degree of
relationship present."
Later hi._tory. Shaklee and others (Shaklee and Tucker, 1980; Shaklee and Mires, 1981;
Shaklee and Mims, 1982) evaluated which of several possible rules subjects might be using
in forming judgments of covariation. Shaklee and Mims (1982) summarized the results:
"'Conditional-probability rule patterns [the correct rule] were produced by sizeable mi-
norities of subjects in the 10th-grade (17%-27_) and college (33-38%). Sum-of-diagonals
judgment patterns [comparing a+d to b+c] were common as early as seventh grade (50%
of the sample) and persisted through the college years (35%-38%). Systematic a-versus-
b rule patterns appeared as early as the fourth grade (29% of the sampIe) and remained
common through college age Cell-a patterns [the one suggested by Smedslund
1963)] were rare at all ages in the fourth grade to college age span (0%-8%)."
In all these experiments subjects used data presented in tables. Shaklee and Mires
1982) showed subjects the data sequentially. Some subjects were asked to estimate the
frequencies in the four cells; all subjects were asked to assess covariation. The authors found
that the covariation judgments of subjects asked to estimate frequencies were less accurate
than those of subjects given summary tables, partly due to the use of less accurate judgment
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rules. "In particular, conditional-probability and sum-of-diagonals patterns declined in
frequency, whereas a-versus-b and cell-a patterns became more common. This preference
for simpler rules compromises judg'ment accuracy at the same time that it simplifies the
demanding decision environment."
Arkes and Harkness (1983) found that several factors affected which rules subjects
applied, including the words used in labeling, memory load, salience, and method of es-
timation (a running estimate or only a final estimate). Beyth-Marom (1982) gave three
factors accounting for the variability of results. Serial presentation of data encouraged
the use of the a-only rule, while tabular presentation encouraged other rules. Some task
instructions pointed to cell a, others to more cells. Finally, some studies used symmetric
variables (for example, gender) in which both categories (male and female) have similar
status as diagnostic clues, while other studies used asymmetric variables (for example,
symptom) in which the two categories (symptom present and symptom absent) differ in
perceived usefulness for a target category such as pneumonia present or absent.
Summary. There is considerable variation across and within experiments in the rule
used by subjects in assessing covariation, with no simple pattern of people relying only on
positive hits. When the task involves remembering data presented sequentially, subjects
do seem to use simpler rules to judge relationships than when data are presented in a table.
Overprediction
Definition. In order to predict one variable from another, a person must be aware of
the regression effect.
"A fundamental rule of the normative theory of prediction is that the variability of predic-
tions, over a set of cases, should reflect predictive accuracy. When predictive accuracy is
perfect [a correlation of 1 or -li, one predicts the criterion value that will actually occur.
When uncertainty is maximal [a correlation of 0], a fixed value is predicted in all cases ....
With intermediate predictive accuracy, the variability of predictions takes an intermediate
value, that is, predictions are regressive with respect to the criterion" (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1973).
The error made by some subjects is to give similar predictions for situations with different
degrees of uncertainty.
Early hi,_ory. In Kahneman and Tversky (1973) two groups of subjects were given
a verbal description of a college freshman and asked to give either (1) the percentage of
freshmen likely to have a more impressive description, or (2) the percentage of freshmen
likely to have a higher grade point average than this student. The subject should have
greater uncertainty about the second question since the evaluation of the student could
have been wrong or the evaluation might not have been an accurate prediction of grade
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point average; the answers to the second question should have been more regressive, that is,
should be closer to the mean. The results of this study were that the two groups produced
estimates that did not differ in variability.
Kahneman and Tversky discussed the difficulty of teaching the regression effect even to
graduate students. They illustrated this with an example in which instructors in a flight
school found that "high praise for good execution of complex maneuvers typically results
in a decrement of performance on the next try." Not one of the graduate students to whom
this situation was described suggested regression as an explanation.
Later hi_tory. Nisbett and Ross (1980) reported unpublished experiments by Amabile
and by Ross, Amabile, and Jennings which showed that "very few individuals systemati-
cally applied anything like a simple linear 'prediction equation.'"
"When subjects believed the relationship between variables to be strong, their individual
predictions were often well matched by a simple linear function, but then they believed the
relationship to be weak, their predictions varied widely around any potential regression
line. Specifically, when subjects believed the relationship between X and Y to be relatively
weak, they did not respond to extreme values of X with predictions of Y that were consis-
tently moderately close to the mean. Instead, they responded by varying the extremity of
their predictions (for examples, by predicting one very extreme value of Y and one value
of Y close to the mean when given two identical values of the predictor variable X)."
As in the experiments concerning the use of base-rate and sample size information, Fis-
chhoff et al. (1979) replicated the experiments in a within-subjects, rather than between-
subjects framework, in order to draw the subjects' attention to the regression effect. Each
subject predicted the grade point average associated with the 5th, 15th, 25th, ..., and 95th
percentiles of three distributions of different types of scores. "One set of percentiles was
described as coming from the distribution of GPA's one came from scores on a test of
mental concentration described as having a moderate correlation with GPA; and one came
from a measure of sense of humor described as having a low but positive correlation with
GPA." Fischhoff et al. found that "It]he sense of humor judgments were markedly regressed
relative to the GPA and mental concentration judgments, with mental concentration judg-
ments somewhere in between GPA and sense of humor. These differences contrast with
the virtual identity of Kalmeman and Tversky's (1973) mental concentration and GPA
groups and slight regression with the sense of humor group."
Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) questioned the underlying normative model used to la-
bel this error: "extreme predictions are not suboptimal in nonstationary processes. In
fact, given a changing process, regressive predictions are suboptimal .... IT]he optimal
prediction is conditional on which hypothesis you hold."
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Summary. In these experiments, the experimenter creates a situation in which he
believes that unexplainable random variation contributes to a phenomenon. The subject
may disagree with the experimenter in that he thinks that he can explain the variation.
In the experiment, the experimenter has guaranteed that he is correct, but in real-world
situation, the subject may often be correct.
Illusion of control
Definition. The illusion of control is "the perception of control over objectively chance-
deterrrfined events" (Langer and Roth, 1975).
Early history. Langer (1975) demonstrated illusion of control in subjects by asking the
size of bet the subjects were willing to make. For example, subjects, on the average, placed
smaller bets against a confident opponent in the game of drawing a high card than against a
less confident opponent. The subject was told the experiment concerned the measurement
of skin resistance. Langer also found that the more similar the chance situation was to
a skill situation, the greater was the illusion of control. "This illusion may be induced
by introducing competition, choice, stimulus or response familiarity, or passive or active
involvement into a chance situation."
Langer and Roth (1975)'found that subjects given early successes were likely to expe-
rience an illusion of control even in a coin tossing experiment. "l%[ost of the subjects in
the random and ascending groups gave responses that characterize a mechaa'ficM reading
of objective probabilities, but subjects in the descending group deviated from these two
groups."
Langer (1975) comments that in real situations it is not always easy to distinguish skill
situations from chance situations: "'there is an element of chance in every skill situation
and an element of skill in almost every chance situation. The former is obvious and needs
no further explication here. Examples of the latter are knowing what a good bet is in a
game of dice (i.e., knowing the odds) or knowing which slot machines are rigged to given
the highest payoffs."
Later history. Various researchers have found that depressed persons are not as suscep-
tible to the illusion of control as nondepressed persons. Alloy and Abramson (1982) noted
that this idea agrees with "theories of depression that portray the depressive as a person
who believes that he or she is ineffective and powerless to obtain desired outcomes."
Summary. The phrase "illusion of control" is a misnomer. Subjects are not asked di-
rectly whether they believe they can control an event; rather they are asked the probability
that they will win on future trials or they are asked to select the size of a bet. "Illusion of
control" means they overestimate the probability or bet too large an amount, compared to
probabilities determined by the experiment. Subjects could overestimate the probability
25
of winning without having any illusion that they can control an event.
The essential difference between experimenter and subject is their beliefs concerning
the probabilities that determine certain events. Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) commented:
"Although Langer's ... findings are compatible with those of the human learning studies,
their interpretation is unclear. Expectancies of success may reflect factors other than
people's beliefs about the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes ...;
most notably, they may reflect beliefs about the stability of causes that produced past
Success."
The next four errors deal with logical deduction. The first two deal with the types of
tests subjects make in testing or discovering a rule.
Incorrect testing of a conditional rule
Definition. In this error, a subject fails to identify the correct cases that must be
checked in order to test the validity of a conditional rule, that is, a rule of the form "If ...,
then .... "
Early hi_tory. In Wason (1968) "[s]ubjects were presented with the following sentence,
'if there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even number on the other
side,' together with four cards each of which had a letter on one side and a number on the
other side. The task was to select all those cards, but only those cards, which would have
to be turned over in order to discover whether the experimenter was lying in making the
conditional sentence." If the sentence is represented symbolically as "if P, then Q," then,
with four cards representing P (a vowel), not-P (a consonant), Q (an even number), and
not-Q (an odd number), the correct answer is that the two cards representing P (a vowel)
and not-Q (an odd number) must be turned over. Wason found that "[n]early all subjects
select P, from 60 to 75 percent select Q, only a minority select not-Q and hardly any select
not-P. Thus two errors axe committed, the consequent is fallaciously affirmed [by selecting
Q] and the contrapositive is withheld [by not selecting not-Q]."
This version has been repeated many times with similar results. The experiment has
also been replicated with thematic versions, that is, versions with a more realistic setting.
Some researchers reported that the error rate is reduced in thematic versions and other
researchers found little or no effect of realism. They found poor performance on the
thematic versions compared to the previously cited studies.
The following authors found improvement due to reafism. \Vason and Shapiro (1971)
used the rule "Every time I go to Manchester I travel by car." Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi,
and Legrenzi (1972) used the rule "If a letter is sealed then it has a 50 lire stamp on it."
Rumelhart and Norman (1981) reported on experiments by D'Andrade using an abstract
version involving checking the quality of labels produced and a thematic version involving
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checking that a sale at Sears over a certain amount has the manager's signature. Griggs
and Cox (1982) used the rule "If a student is drinking beer, then the person must be over 19
years of age." Griggs and Cox (1983) used the drinking age version and the Sears version.
The following table shows that these researchers found that the percent of subjects who
gave the correct answer (P and not-Q) increased dramatically with thematic versions:
Study
Wason and Shapiro (1971)
Johnson-Laird et al. (1972)
Rumelhart and Norman (1981)
Griggs and Cox (1982)
Griggs and Cox (1983)
abstract thematic thematic rule
2/16=13% 10/16=63% travel
2/24=8% 21/24=88% postal
13% 70% Sears
0/40=0% 29/40=73% drinking
1/20=5% 14/20=70% drinking
17/20=85% Sears
Other authors have found that thematic material did not improve performance. Mank-
telow and Evans (1979) used rules involving food such as "If I eat macaroni, then I do not
drink champagne," as well as the travel sentence of Wason and Shapiro. Griggs and Cox
(1982) also used a travel sentence and the postal version of Johnson-Laird et al. (1972).
Brown, Keats, Keats, and Seggie (1980) used a travel sentence. Yachanin and Tweney
(1982) used various thematic versions. Reich and Ruth (1982) used a travel sentence. As
shown in the following table these researchers found little or no effect of thematic versions:
Study
Ma.uktelow and Evan (1979)
Griggs and Cox (1982)
Brown et al. (1980)
Yachanin and Tweney (1982)
Reich and Ruth (1982.)
abstract thematic thematic rule
8/24=33% 7/24=29% food (% saying not-Q)
1/16=6% 2/16=13_. travel (% saying not-Q)
0/32=0% 3/32=9% travel
1/24=4% 2/24=8_ postal
1/24=4% 2/24=8% travel
- 5/160=3% various
- 3/24=13% travel
Many of these differences between these two tables are still unexplained. The differ-
ence between these two tables has been explained for the postal version of Johnson-Laird
e_ al. (1972); successful replication depends on having a population familiax with such
postal regulations (Griggs and Cox, 1982). Manktelow and Evans (1979) argued that this
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indicates the postal version is a memory task, not a reasoning task. Griggs and Cox (1982)
agreed, arguing that subjects call up past experience rather than performing conscious rea-
soning. Rumelhaxt and Norman (1981) argued that reasoning is involved, but not abstract
reasoning; the effect they observed "is exactly the kind of effect expected if our knowledge
is embedded in a relatively inaccessible procedural format rather than as general rules of
inference."
Later history. Several authors have argued that the meaning of an "if-then" sentence
varies considerably; a thematic version allows an unambiguous interpretation (Klayman
and Ha, 1987). Indeed, other authors (starting with Wason, 1968) have noted that even
philosophers disagree on the interpretation of "if P, then Q" with some arguing that sit-
uations where not-P holds are simply irrelevant to the truth of the conditional. Others
have noted that a sentence like "If you mow the lawn, I'll give you five dollars" "carries
the invited inference (pragmatic implication) that if the hearer does not mow the lawn, he
will not get five dollars" (Harris and Monaco, 1978). Furthermore, "if-then" sometimes
means disjunction: "If it isn't John, then it's John's brother" (Wason and Johnson-Laird,
1972).
Several authors have addressed the larger issue of whether humans are generally logical
in their reasoning. Henle (1962) argued that even when subjects appear to violate syllogis-
tic reasoning they have, in fact, formed a valid syllogism, but by altering the information
in some way, for example by changing one of the premises. Smedslund (1970) pointed out
that one cannot test a subject's logical thought without assuming that the subject under-
stands the information: vice versa, one cannot test his understanding without assuming he
is logical in his thinking.
Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1986) contrasted two extreme views of human
reasoning: {1) people use "syntactic, domain-independent rules of logic:" and (2) people
"develop much narrower rules tied to particular content domains in which people have
actual experience." They discussed a middle approach: (3) people use "'pragmatic reason-
ing schemas: clusters of rules that are highly generMized and abstracted but nonetheless
defined with respect to classes of goals and types of relationships." For example, certain
versions of the "if P, then Q" task led subjects to use a schema for "permission." Cheng and
Holyoak (1985) found that simply rephrasing the abstract rule to emphasize permission
increased the percent of subjects giving correct solutions from 17% to 67_7_.
Summary. A consensus seems to be growing that the ambiguity in the meaning of
"if-then" leads many subjects astray. Since in a real-world situation the meaning is likely
to be clearer, this error may occur infrequently in natural settings.
In the next error, subjects are not given a rule to test, but must generate it themselves.
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Confirmation bias
Definition. The phrase confirmation bias has been used to label various phenomena. We
will use Wason's original definition: a bias toward testing instances expected to be positive
instances under one's current hypothesis, in preference to testing instances expected to be
negative instances.
Early hiatory. Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) found that some subjects used a
strategy which they called successive scanning to solve a concept attainment task. Suc-
cessive scanning involves focusing on a particular hypothesis and testing it by its ability
to predict exemplars. Bruner et al. found that "in dealing with the task of sorting out
relevant from irrelevant cues in the environment, subjects persist until they are able to
make direct tests with positive instances."
Wason (1960) noted that this strategy could lead to errors. "For example, if the correct
concept is 'red figures' ..., it is possible to attain the incorrect concept, 'red circles,' by
consistent use of confirming evidence ... " Wason therefore designed an experiment in
which this strategy was likely to lead subjects astray: "[s]ubjects were told that the three
numbers 2, 4, 6 conformed to a simple relational rule and that their task was to discover
it by making up successive sets of three numbers, using information given after each set to
the effect that the numbers conformed, or did not conform, to the rule." The correct rule
was any three numbers in increasing order; many subjects initially formed the hypothesis
numbers increasing by 2.
Wason looked at the compatibility between the hypothesis the subject said he was
testing and the instance the subject generated to test it. Those who solved the problem
correctly produced a higher average number of incompatible instances, thus demonstrating
that success in the task was aided by generating instances that disconfirm the subject's
current hypothesis.
It is important to examine carefully the error made by Wason's subjects. Subjects
generated compatible instances by asking about instances for which they expected the
answer "yes" (for example, 10-12-14 under the hypothesis of numbers increasing by 2).
We cannot say that they sought only confirming evidence, since confirming evidence can
be sought by asking about instances to which one expects the answer "no" (for example,
10-12-13). Also, in the subjects' minds, 10-12-14 could possibly have led to the answer
"no" and thus could have generated disconfirming evidence. The subjects' bias is thus
best characterized as saying that they asked about instances for which they expected the
answer "yes" under their current hypothesis.
This bias is not always an error. Consider the subject's beliefs about what will happen
if he asks about an instance to which he thinks he will receive the answer "yes." If the
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subject believes that his current hypothesis is likely to be correct, then he will also think
it likely that he will receive the answer "yes." If he also believes that should his hypothesis
be wrong, the answer "yes" is very unlikely, then once he receives the answer "yes" he
will have a very strong belief that his current hypothesis is correct. Finally, if he receives
the answer "no," he can definitively rule out his current hypothesis; he, of course, believes
this is unlikely to occur. With these beliefs, the strategy of testing instances to which he
expects to receive the answer "yes" is not a bad one. Rather than attribute his error to his
strategy, one might better attribute it to his incorrect beliefs that his current hypothesis
is very likely to be correct and that a "yes" answer is unlikely if his hypothesis is wrong.
Later history. Other researchers have attempted to study this phenomenon using less
artificial tasks. Snyder and Swarm (1978), for example, performed a series of experiments
asking subjects to test whether someone is extraverted (other subjects were asked to test
introverted) by selecting 12 questions from a list of 26. Of the 26 questions, 11 were
extraverted questions, that is, questions that "would typically be asked of people already
known to be extraverts, for example, 'What would you do if you wanted to liven up things
at a party?'"; 10 were introverted questions, "for example, 'In what situations do you wish
you could be more outgoing?'"; and 5 were questions for which there was no consensus
or which were classified as irrelevant, "for example, 'What kinds of charities do you like
to contribute to?'" Subjects asked to test for extraversion used more extravert questions
than subjects asked to test for introversion, even when told that extraversion was unlikely
to be true, and even when offered monetary incentives for accurate testing. Snyder and
Campbell (1980) found similar results.
The questions labeled as confirming questions in this study are those that corresponded
to the category for which the subject was asked to test. However, these differ crucially
from the similar questions in Wason's experiment. In Snyder and Swann's study, even an
introverted person would probably answer with suggestions on how to liven up a party. An
introvert could refute the subject's hypothesis only by uncooperatively refusing to accept
the assumption "if you wanted to liven up things at a party." Under any of the possible
hypotheses, this question is likely to generate similar answers; this is not the case for
Wason's experiment. In Wason's experiment, if a subject tested an instance for which he
expected the answer "yes," then if his current hypothesis were wrong, he could receive a
disconfirming answer. In Wason's experiment the correct hypothesis (increasing numbers)
does give the same answers as the subjects' incorrect hypothesis (numbers increasing by
2) to instances likely to be generated by the subjects, but this fact is not known by the
subjects. The error made by subjects in Snyder and Swann's study is thus to use questions
which they should know are very unlikely to generate disconfirming evidence under any
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hypothesis. Wason's subjects did not make this error.
The following tables show the possible situations that might occur in Wason's experi-
ment and in Snyder and Swann's experiment.
Subject receives
Wason's experiment: "yes" "no"
Subject expects "yes" A B
"no" C D
Snyder and Swann's experiment:
Subject expects extraverted answer
introverted answer
Subject receives
extraverted introverted
A B
C D
(Subject is testing for extraversion.)
The confirmation bias is that subjects tend to ask questions in the first row in each ex-
periment. For subjects who formulated the hypothesis numbers increasing by 2, situation
B is impossible since this hypothesis is a special case of the true rule, increasing num-
bers; however, the subject does not know this. While in Snyder and Swann's experiment,
situation B is very unlikely, the subject can realize this.
Some authors questioned the methodology of the experiments by Snyder and Swarm
and by Snyder and Campbell. "As there were only 5 neutral questions in the set of 26
possibilities, subjects still had to choose many normeutral ones in their set of 12 test ques-
tions" (Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom, 1983). Trope, Bassok, and Aion (1984) suggested
that several characteristics of Snyder and Swann's task, including the presence of biased
questions, may have led to subjects to think "that his/her task is to focus on the hypoth-
esized trait and make discrimination within it, that (s)he is to discriminate between those
who match the description of, say, the fully extroverted person and those possessing more
moderate levels of extroversion." For the subject who realized that what we call situation
B was very unlikely, Trope et al. '_ suggestion might be a reasonable inference about why
the experimenter included biased questions.
Trope et al. (1984) allowed subjects to spontaneously formulate questions and con-
eluded: "The strategy emerging from the kinds of questions our subjects formulated is
clearly at variance with the confirmatory strategy .... Out of the 586 questions formulated
by the Israeli and Canadian samples, our judges were able to find only two questions that
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assumed that the respondent possessed the hypothesized trait." Dallas and Baron (1985)
found a confirmation bias among psychotherapists when replicating Snyder and Swann's
constrained choice, but did not find this when the subjects designed their own questions.
Strohmer and Newman (1983) were concerned about the implications of the confirma-
tory strategy for the questioning strategies counselors might use. However, after a series of
experiments, they concluded: "Our results do not support the suggestion that counselors
preferentially seek information to confirm hypotheses about clients .... When asked to
write questions to test a hypothesis about a target client, all participants constructed a
strategy favoring unbiased questions. When asked to test a hypothesis about a client by
asking them questions, all but 3 of the 40 participants used an unbiased strategy." Fur-
thermore, those 3 used a disconfirmatory strategy. Sackett (1982) replicated several of
Snyder and Swann's (1978) studies as well as others, but used campus recruiters rather
than college students as subjects. Sackett did not find consistent use of the confirmatory
strategy.
Subjects may use a diagnostic strategy rather than a confirmatory strategy. "Trope
and Bassok [1982] suggested that lay interviewers test their hypothesis by selecting ques-
tions according to their diagnostic value, i.e., the extent to which the probabilities of the
answers depend on whether or not the respondent possesses the hypothesized trait" (Trope
and Bassok, 1983). Support for this theory is provided by experiments by Trope and Bas-
sok (1983), Trope, Bassok and Alon (1984), and Skov and Sherman (1986). "Subjects
preferred information that was most useful for distinguishing between the hypothesis and
the alternative .... In fact, diagnosticity was the main determinant of question selection.
Given a choice between a high diagnostic and hypothesis disconfirming question vs a low
diagnostic and hypothesis confirming question, subjects almost always chose the former"
(Skov and Sherman, 1986).
Swarm and Giuliano (1987) replied to criticisms of the Snyder and Swarm 1978 study.
They replicated the experiment of Snyder and Swarm but, like Trope and Bassok, asked
subjects to write questions, rather than to choose from a list. They found that subjects
are more likely to probe for evidence of dominance (rather than submissiveness) when
they were testing for dominance and more likely to probe for evidence of extraversion
(rather than introversion) when they were testing for extraversion. Strikingly, whether
testing extraversion or introversion, subjects were more likely to probe for extraversion;
similarly, whether testing dominance or submissiveness, subjects were more likely to probe
for dominance.
Mynatt, Doherty, and Tweney (1977) asked subjects to discover the rules governing the
dynamics of moving particles in a computer generated system. The correct answer was that
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dim figures (but not bright ones) stopped particles. Subjects were led to form an initial
hypothesis that triangles stop particles (other shapes were squares and circles). Subjects
were then given 10 pairs of choices in which they could pick 1 of 2 experiments. We can
form a table similar to our previous ones to discuss the subjects' choice of experiment:
Subject
Mynatt et al. 's experiment: stops
Subject expects: particle stops A
continues C
receives: particle
continues
B
D
Mynatt et al. labeled as confirmatory selections of experiments in the first row in which
situation B was impossible; they found that subjects with the initial triangle hypothesis
made 71_ such choices, significantly different from the 50% expected by chance. However,
as in Wason's experiment, subjects did not know situation B was impossible; choices
counted as confirmatory were constructed so that the hypothesis "triangles stop particles"
was a special case of the correct rule "dim figures stop particles."
In an effort to create a more reahstic task, Mynatt, Doherty, and Tweney (1978) used a
more complex environment and let subjects explore in a less constrained manner. Objects
could be of three different shapes, three different sizes, and three different brightnesses.
At certain points determined by the objects in its vicinity a moving particle was deflected
at an angle. The umverse contained all 27 possible objects, but subjects could view only
a portion of the universe at once although the behavior of a particle in that portion could
be influenced by objects off the screen. Again, subjects were told to discover the rules of
particle motion. The correct rules were complicated; the angle of deflection depended on
size and brightness of nearby objects, but not on shape.
The space of hypotheses in this experiment is huge; for example, one subject formed
hypotheses based on lines between objects, a feature which was, in fact, irrelevant. No
subject solved the system; judges ranked subjects' performances on how close they came
to the correct rules.
Mynatt et al. remark:
"Outcomes of hypothesis tests were categorized after the fact bv the experimenters. It was
often difficult to determine unambiguously what type of evidence subjects were seeking (as
opposed to what they actually got). There was, however, almost no indication whatsoever
that they intentionally sought disconfirmation. In those few cases where there ,,'as enough
information in the protocols to allow a judgment to be made, subjects almost always
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seemed to be seeking confirmation."
Mynatt et al. do not show that this behavior led to poor performance. They did find
that even though subjects sought confirmation, they received disconfirmation much more
often. Thus, although subjects tended to choose questions in the first row of our tables,
they most often ended up in situation B. Performance did depend on how well the subject
handled the information received in such a situation; this question is discussed in a later
section of this paper on hypothesis fixation.
In Wason's task, subjects were forced to generate a hypothesis about the correct rule
and then test the hypothesis by generating instances. Subjects failed to reach the correct
conclusion because they tended to (1) generate a hypothesis that was a special case of the
correct solution (for example, numbers increasing by two) and (2) test only instances for
which they expected the answer "yes." The second behavior is the confirmation bias, but
the first behavior can be viewed as a property of the problem rather than of the subjects.
Klayman and Ha 1987 accepted that the confirmation bias exists (they call it the positive
text strategy) but argued that Wason's task is unnatural because the nature of the correct
solution leads subjects to form a hypothesis of the wrong "size." Usually one is seeking
to define a minority phenomenon, rather than such a general one as any three increasing
numbers. Thus, Klayman and Ha concluded: "'Under commonly occurring conditions, this
strategy can be well suited to the basic goal of determining whether or not a hypothesis is
correct."
Other authors have noted that the norm against which this error is defined is that of the
Popperian view of science, that is, that theories should be tested by attempts to disconfirm
them. This view is not universally accepted as the appropriate procedure in science and
thus is not unassailable as a norm against which naive subjects should be compared.
Summary. For the confirmation bias to occur on a task, people have to use a hypothesis
generation and testing strategy. There is abundant evidence that, on many artificial and
realistic tasks, people do use such a strategy. In addition, for the confirmation bias to
occur, people must use what Klayman and Ha called a positive test strategy. They must
test a hypothesis by looking for data that are expected to be present if that hypothesis
is correct. There is mixed evidence regarding the occurrence of this behavior. On some
tasks, it appears to occur, while on others it does not.
Even when both of these conditions are present, the efficiency of the positive test
strategy depends on the relationships among the potential hypotheses and the data with.
which they are consistent. In some tasks, a positive test strategy can lead to efficient
confirmation of a correct hypothesis or efficient disconfirmation of an incorrect hypothesis
(Smith, Gift-m, Rockwell, and Thomas, 1986); in other tasks, certain hypotheses, when
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combined with the use of a positive test strategy, will lead a subject to collect only data
that cannot reject the subject's hypothesis.
Whatever information a subject seeks, he may receive disconfirming information, de-
pending on the relationship between his hypothesis and the correct solution. The next two
errors deal with subjects' behavior in such situations.
Differential treatment of positive and negative information
Definition. Brunet et al. (19,56) noted: "[A] general tendency is the inability or
unwillingness of subjects to use efl:iciently information which is based on negative instances
or derives from indirect test of an hypothesis." People process information more effi.ciently
if it is presented in a positive form (for example, an event occurred) than if it is presented
in a negative form (an event did not occur). This can be labeled an error in that a subject
does not use all the information he could from a negative statement.
Earl v hia_or v. There is a long history of experiments on the learning of concepts from
positive and negative instances. Smoke (1933) found that a concept can be learned equally
quickly from both positive and negative instances as from positive instances only but that
learning from positive and negative instances discouraged learning of incorrect concepts
compared to learning from positive instances only. Smoke did not test subjects using only
negative instances but Hovland and Weiss (1953) did. They found that "a significantly
greater percentage of subjects working with positive instances than of subjects working
with negative instances '*'ere able to identify the concepts correctly. This was true even
when the total number of instances presented was equal for both groups and when the
memory factor was eliminated" (Freibergs and Tulving, 1961).
Freibergs and Tulving (1961) found that practice had a very large effect on the time
required to learn concepts with positive instances and with negative instances. They
trained two groups of subjects. The P Group "*'as trained to solve problems using positive
instances only, while the N Group used negative instances only. The P Group began
with a large advantage over the N Group, but after 20 trials, "the difference between the
two medians is quite small, especially when compared with the initial difference." It also
appeared that the P Group was leveling off in median performance while the N Group was
still improving.
Later Iziator v. Newman, Wolff, and Hearst (1980) report on a series of experiments
which show the feature-positive effect. For example, one group of subjects had to learn
the concept that Good patterns included one diamond among 4 symbols; another group
had to learn the concept that Not Good patterns included one diamond among 4 symbols.
The average number of trials required to learn the correct solution was significantly higher
for the second group. However. if all subjects were told "something about each of the
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Not Good cards makesthem Not Good" then the averageperformanceof the two groups
reversed.
A similar effect was found by Tweney et al. (1980). They tried various strategies to
teach subjects to use a disconfirmatory strategy to solve Wason's 2-4-6 task. While they
found effects on strategy, only one change in instructions led to improved performance.
Rather than referring to one rule and labeling instances offered by the subject as "con-
forming" or "not conforming," the experimenter said there were two rules and labeled
instances as "DAX" or ".MED." The results were dramatic; in Wason's original experi-
meats and various replications, 16 out of 98 subjects solved the problem with the first rule
announced while with the variation in wording 21 out of 37 did so.
Most of the research on this effect has required the subject to identify which conjunctive
hypothesis is correct from a set of possible conjunctive hypotheses. Many researchers have
noted that it is usually the case that a positive instance allows the elimination of many more
conjunctive hypotheses than is allowed by a negative instance. It is not at all surprising
that people attend to and find it easier to use positive information in this context (see,
for example, Nahinsky and Slaymaker, 1970). Bourne and Guy (1968) presented evidence
that subjects are better able to process information that comes from a smaller and more
homogeneous set. Whether the set of positive or negative information has that property
depends on the nature of the problem.
Markus and Zajonc (1985) reviewed evidence for a negativity bias in which negative
information is given greater weight in comparing alternatives. They concluded that such an
effect exists but, like Bourne and Guy, question whether it is always an error. "Negativity
is a bias to the extent that in the drawing of inferences negative information is given more
weight on the a priori false grounds that it leads to valid inferences or better decisions.
However, if in general negative items are in fact more informative than positive items, then
negativity may well be regarded not as a bias but as a useful and defensible heuristic that
serves the individual well on appropriate occasions."
In another task setting, Evans (1982) reviewed a series of experiments in which subjects
were required to either verify or construct sentences that were either af_mative or negative,
and either true or false. While results concerning true and false sentences were ambiguous,
Evans found that "It]he one undisputed result that all these experiments (and similar
subsequent ones) have in common is that negatives are reliably more difficult to process."
Similarly, Taplin (1975) used response time data to test the idea that positive information
is easier to process than negative information. He asked subjects to classify an instance
as a positive or negative instance according to the concept under test. He looked at four
types of concepts: conjunction (A and B), inclusive disjunction (A or B), conditional (if A,
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then B), and biconditional (A if and only if B). Errors were very infrequent. The average
response time across all types was less for positive instances than for negative instances,
but this varied by rule. The average time was less for positive instances for conjunction and
more for positive instances for conditional; no significant difference was found on inclusive
disjunction or biconditional.
Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead ('1981) asked physicians to estimate the probabil-
ity that a patient has pneumonia based on the presence or absence of particular symptoms.
They regressed the subjective probability on the actual probability for symptoms present
and symptoms absent and obtained a positive slope, although the coefficient was smaller
for absent symptoms than for present symptoms. However, they note that if one outlier
(out of 45 points) is omitted, the two coefficients are nearly equal. They concluded that
"physicians in this study appear to use the absence of a clinical finding as efficiently as
the presence of clinical finding when estimating the predictive value of the finding." The
authors note that this result may be due to the fact that the procedures of their experiment
(in particular, the use of a checklist) may have called physicians' attention to the absence
of a symptom.
Summary. There is evidence that negative information is more difficult than positive
information for humans to use both in concept learning and in reaching conclusions, but it
is unclear whether that is due to the fact that positive information often has more useful
information. Also, even though the response time data indicated that negative information
takes longer and thus may be more difficult to process, errors were infrequent.
Hypothesis fixation
Definition. Hypothesis fixation occurs when a subject maintains a hypothesis that has
been demonstrated conclusively to be false.
Early history. Wason's 2-4-6 experiment, one of the original works in the confirmation
bias, is also one of the original works in hypothesis fixation. "After the announcement
of an incorrect rule it would be expected, on a rational basis, that a high. proportion of
the immediately succeeding series would be inconsistent with the rule just announced, ie
subjects would relinquish their hypotheses. In fact, over the entire experiment, sixteen such
series were consistent and fifteen inconsistent with the rule announced. This experiment
strongly suggested that the subjects were either unwilling, or unable to eliminate their
hypotheses in this task."
Later history. *lynatt, Doherty, and Tweney (1977) performed a series of experiments
(discussed earler in relation to the confirmation bias) in which they asked subjects to
formulate and test hypotheses about the effects of objects of various shapes and brightness
on the behavior of particles in a computer simulation. They found that subjects failed to
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consideralternative hypotheses,but were able to use falsifying data if it werepresent.
In their 1978study using a more complex environment, subjects receivedmany more
disconfirmations of hypothesesthan confirmations. "[M]ost subjects showeda strong ten-
dency to discount or disregard falsification. Of the 88 hypothesis tests ... which resulted
in disconfirmation, only 26 led to the permanent abandonmentof the hypothesis. Follow-
ing the remaining 62 tests, the subjects either abandonedthe hypothesis but returned to
it later, revised it to attempt to account for the anomalous data, or simply ignored the
disconfirmation and went on testing the samehypothesis."
The test strategy usedseemedto havelessimpact on the successrate than the goodness
of the initial hypothesisgenerated.From the 1977study: "In all of our studies, therehave
been subjects who very quickly picked the correct hypothesis, tested it once or twice,
and announced the rule, completing the task in very short time. Someof the subjects
usedconfirmation and someused disconfirmation. 'Luck' may well be, ironically, the best
predictor of success,as it seemedto be in oneof our earfier studies." In somecases,subjects
did better if they ignored disconfirming evidence. In commenting on the 1977 study,
Twenty, Doherty, Worrier, Pliske, 3[ynatt, Gross, and Arkkelin (1980) were surprised
to find "that subjects who focused on disconfirmatory evidence could be led seriously
astray. Nor were we prepared to find that extensive searches for confirmatory evidence.
and some discounting of disconfirmatory evidence, would characterize the most _ucce_fut
subjects. But that is what happened." Mynatt, Doherty, and Twenty (1978) commented:
"Occasionally, a subject would hit on a promising, but partially incorrect, hypothesis.
Since the hypothesis was only partially correct, it would sooner or later receive clear
disconfirmation. Three different subjects quickly abandoned promising hypotheses and
began testing others which were, in fact, much less close to the 'truth.'"
Some authors have questioned whether hypothesis fixation should be viewed as an
error. Cohen (1981) said: "retention of a falsified hypothesis would even be desirable if it
explained quite a lot of the evidence and no un.falsified hypothesis were available that had
as good explanatory value." Nisbett and Ross (1980) discussed the difficulty of knowing
when a subject should abandon a hypothesis. Such a statement "presupposes that we can
determine when the person is 'inappropriately' persisting in an impression or belief whose
basis has been undermined."
Twenty et al. (1980) suggested that a complicated inference task first requires for-
mulating a set of good hypotheses "in the sense that they must possess at least some
correspondence to reality to be worthwhile candidates for test. Thus, seeking confirma-
tory data and ignoring disconfirmatory data may be the most appropriate strategy early
in the inference process, since it could then produce good hypotheses." They found that
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successful subjects did seem to use this strategy.
Biased assimilation, the interpretation of neutral or negative evidence as being sup-
portive of one's already held beliefs, can be viewed as a weaker form of hypothesis fixation.
In hypothesis fixation, a person holds onto a belief in the face of logically contradictory
evidence, while in biased assimilation the evidence may not obviously contradict the sub-
ject's belief, but it also does not support it. However, biased assimilation also includes the
idea that the person misinterprets information presented to him.
Skov and Sherman (1986) discuss "the case where a hypothesis tester gathers informa-
tion and biases the interpretation of that information so that the hypothesis appears to
be true. For example, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) demonstrated that subjects' initiM
beliefs in the use of capital punishment led them to bias their interpretation of evidence
that was objectively neutral with respect to capital punishment. In other words, subjects
on both sides of the issue ended up believing more than ever that their initial hypotheses
were true. Likewise, Regan, Straus, and Fazio (1974) showed how subjects bias their at-
tributions for success and failures by friends and enemies so that their hypotheses about
the traits of these people axe confirmed."
Lord et al. (1979) also found that subjects rated as more sound studies that supported
their initial beliefs. ']?he authors comment, however, that such a rating is rational; studies
that agree with a known truth should be given more credence. "Our subjects' main
inferential shortcoming, in other words, did not lie in their inclination to process evidence
in a biased manner .... Rather, their sin lay in their readiness to use evidence already
processed in a biased manner to bolster the very theory or belief that initially 'justified'
the processing bias."
Summary. It is difficult to demonstrate the extreme case of a subject's maintaining
a clearly refuted conclusion since the degree of refutation can be questioned. Such a
demonstration would be even more difficult in real situations, where conclusively refuting
evidence is rarely present or can always be interpreted as not being as decisive as might
seem.
Conclusions
For many of the errors discussed in this review, significant doubts have been raised
about whether the behavior is common. For example, in the results regarding sensitivity
to sample size, estimation of covariation by relying only on positive hits, the confirmation
bias, and the testing of a conditional rule, there is considerable variation across subjects
and considerable variation among experimental results. It is difficult to use the literature
on these subjects to conclude that the existence of a bias has been established.
In other cases, the existence of a behavior has been established but significant doubts
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have been raised about whether the subject has made an error. Often it can be argued that
subjects have made a reasonable interpretation of the experimental conditions presented
to them and have made reasonable inferences, even if the interpretation or the inference
do not match those intended by the experimenter. Such an argument has been made
for base rates and for attribution errors. In the illusion of control and in overprediction,
the experimenter and subject may disagree about the underlying model of the process
generating the data.
In other cases, it has been established that the behavior occurs and that subjects make
an unreasonable interpretation of the problem, but their interpretation is reasonable for a
more realistic version of the problem. For example, in conservatism in revising probabil-
ities, subjects may implicitly assume dependence in data, even though the experimental
conditions make clear this is not the case. In more realistic conditions this assumption
may be appropriate. In illusory correlation, subjects seem to disregard instructions to
base their judgments only on data presented to them; in real situations, they are correct
in incorporating previous information. Indeed, subjects are labeled as ignoring a base rate
if they refuse to use prior information in other contexts. In overprediction, the experi-
menter has created a situation in which the subject's natural tendency to seek explanation
of seemingly random variation is incorrect; however, such a tendency is appropriate in
many real situations. In hypothesis fixation, it seems difficult to determine when such
fixation is appropriate and when it is inappropriate; the experimenter has the advantage
over the subject in knowing the correct hypothesis, but often the subject's behavior is not
unreasonable without such knowledge.
Some biases may operate primarily when subjects are ignorant of the subject. For
example, people generally give reasonable probability judgments when they have appro-
priate substantive knowledge on which to base their judgments. There is some evidence
that miscalibration falls in this category also.
Several of the biases reviewed here do seem to exist and do seem to be errors. Hindsight
bias does seem to occur, although it is unclear whether this is a significant cause of error in
real situations. Subjects do seem to have more difficulty in processing negatively presented
information, but they seem to be able to overcome the difficuhy in order to reach correct
conclusions. In the conjunctive fallacy, subjects may inappropriately reverse the order of
conditioning.
Thus, researchers should use caution in referring to well known biases. The existence
of the bias may not have been established or it may occur very infrequently. Further
caution should be used in referring to such biases as errors. In discussing conservatism
in revising probabilities, Wickens (1984) calls the assumption of interdependence among
4O
data a "rational and legitimate bias." This phrase could well be applied to many of the
phenomena discussed in this paper.
Finally, this review suggests that, to make greater progress in the understanding of
human error, we need to focus more attention on modeling the cognitive processes that
cause particular errors, and on the identification of the contexts in which these processes
are likely to be active. In this way, it may be possible to unravel the seeming contradictions
and confusions present in the literature on different categories of errors.
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ABSTRACT
Currently there is a great deal of interest in putting knowledge-based systems
into the cockpit. But along with this new technology comes an old problem -
pilot acceptance. Although most pilots favor more automation (Chambers &
Nagel, 1985), they do not want systems which move them further out of the
decision-making loop.
One solution that keeps pilots in the loop is knowledge-based systems that act
as cooperative decision aids rather than autonomous decision makers. The
design of such systems, though, is not an easy task. For a cooperative system,
the human-computer interface becomes the critical component, linking the
pilot to the underlying system.
We are exploring a methodology to aid in the design of these interfaces and
underlying systems. This methodology relies on performing a cognitive task
analysis of the current cockpit environment, prototyping potential interfaces
to a cooperative computer-based decision aid, and evaluating and iteratively
redesigning this interface. The context is an intelligent flight path routing
aid.
This report discusses the results of Phase II of our study. The purpose was
1) to perform a cognitive task analysis of the flight planning activities
engaged in by flight crews while enroute, and
2) to evaluate these crews' reactions to one possible interface - the Flight
Plan Advisor (FPA).
The results indicate that the cognitive task analysis is a critical step in
designing the human-computer interfaces of these types of systems. It gives
us insights into the role of the crew, what information assists the crew in this
role, and how the crew actually uses the information. These insights, then,
give us an objective basis for generating truly useful cooperative decision
aids.
1. INTRODUCTION
Although most pilots favor more automation (Chambers & Nagel, 1985), they
do not want systems that move them further out of the decision-making
loop. That is, they do not want systems that
are difficult to understand and, therefore, to judge for reliability, and
take away the pilot's control.
Currently there is a great deal of interest in using knowledge-based systems in
the cockpit to help alleviate problems while keeping the pilot "in the loop."
The assumption is that since knowledge-based systems are designed to more
closely match the structure and level of the users' thought processes
(Norman, 1986), pilots will find these systems easier to understand.
Building a knowledge-based system to help the pilot with a task, however,
does not automatically guarantee that he/she will find the system acceptable.
For example, recent research (Rouse, Geddes & Curry, 1987; Rouse, Rouse &
Hammer, 1982; Woods, 1986) has shown that experienced users do not want
knowledge-based systems which act as autonomous decision makers because
these systems do not give their users enough control. An alternative
paradigm which keeps pilots in the loop is a knowledge-based system which
acts as a cooperative decision aid rather than an autonomous decision maker.
We are currently developing an interface to a cooperative decision aid. Our
long range goals are to
- develop a set of guidelines for interfaces to cooperative systems and
- specify the interface for our particular system, a cooperative decision aid
for replanning a flight path while enroute.
The short term goals of this student project are to
- explore methods for knowledge extraction from experts and
- use these techniques to acquire the appropriate knowledge from experts
in our domain.
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The results from Phase I of this project (Galdes, Smith & Chappell, 1989)
indicated the following:
1) Although we can collect valuable information from pilots during
structured interviews, we still need a detailed understanding of what
goes on in the cockpit environment.
2) It is difficult for pilots to make suggestions and imagine an interface to
a system because typically they are not familiar with the technology
available.
Based on these results, the goals of Phase 1I were to
1) perform a cognitive task analysis of the flight planning activities
engaged in by flight crews while enroute, and
2) evaluate these crews' reactions to one possible interface - the Flight
Plan Advisor (FPA).
Our first goal was to collect data on crews during a flight that required
replanning while enroute, and to perform a cognitive task analysis based on
this data. Specifically, we were concerned with the following questions:
1) What role does the flight crew play in identifying a need for
replanning, in generating flight amendments, and in evaluating
alternative flight plans?
2) What information assists the flight crew in playing its role?
3) How is this information used?
This type of analysis is critical if we are to build effective computer aids for the
flight crew. At present, the literature does not provide an adequate
description of how flight crews, in coordination with Air Traffic Control
(ATC) and Dispatch, cope with situations requiring replanning.
The second goal of this project was to evaluate the interface of a particular
computer aid built by NASA staff (Taylor & Dammann, 1989) - the Flight Plan
Advisor (FPA). The purpose of this evaluation was to gain insights into the
issues associated with putting a flight planning aid in the cockpit.
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The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
data collection and analyses methods including a description of our flight
scenario and the FPA interface. Section 3 gives an overview and examples of
the enroute flight planning task. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the results of the
cognitive task analysis and the evaluation of FPA, respectively. Finally,
section 6 gives some conclusions from this specific study and discusses the
value of these kinds of studies in general.
2. METHODS
As already stated, the goals of this study were to
1) perform a cognitive task analysis of crew members' enroute flight
planning activities, and
2) evaluate the design of a flight planning aid, the Flight Plan Advisor
(FPA) system.
To achieve these goals, we first designed a scenario that would give us insight
into the role of the flight crew in the flight planning process and the
information which the crew needs to support their role. This scenario was
based on a standard flight from San Francisco to Detroit.
The second step was carried out by NASA personnel and focused on
designing and implementing the FPA system. This system provided the crew
with current weather information and suggestions for better flight plans
when one was available.
Third, both the scenario and FPA system were used in full-mission
simulations using the 727 motion-based simulator at NASA Ames Research
Center.
Fourth, we analyzed videotapes of these simulations to build a model of the
flight planning behavior of the crew while enroute. We also used these
4
videotapes and post-flight interviews to evaluate the crews' reactions to the
FPA system.
2.1 The Scenario
To achieve our goals, we first designed a scenario which consisted of several
typical situations that might cause a crew to deviate from their current flight
plan. For example, the winds might not be as forecasted or a thunderstorm
might appear along the crew's current routing. These situations, or "events,"
were designed to give us insight into the role of the flight crew in the
replanning process and what information the crew needs to support their
role. In addition, these events were also designed to create a slowly
worsening fuel situation. This worsening fuel situation gave us insight into
how the crew's role might change as the seriousness of their problem
increases, and how the information they need might also change over time.
Our scenario was a modification of the scenario we developed and tested in
Phase I of this study (Galdes, Smith & Chappell, 1989).
The scenario consisted of a standard flight from San Francisco to Detroit and
is graphically depicted in Figure 1. It included the following six events:
1) During climb-out, ATC holds the aircraft at FL250 because of other air
traffic. The crew's flight plan, however, specifies a cruise altitude of
FL290. ATC informs the crew that they may be held at this lower
altitude for some time. This event immediately forces the crew off of
their scheduled flight plan and increases their fuel burn.
2) The crew is being held at a cruise altitude of FL250 instead of their
flight planned altitude of FL290. FPA receives updated wind
information that shows the actual winds at FL290 (the original cruise
altitude) are well below forecasted winds, and the winds at FL250 will
give a significant savings of time and fuel. FPA, therefore,
recommends to the crew that they should maintain their current
5
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cruise altitude of FL250 and climb to FL290 at BOY. ATC dears the
crew to a cruise altitude of FL290. The crew must now decide whether
to immediately ascend to their originally flight planned cruise altitude
or to follow FPA's recommendation and wait until BOY to climb.
3) The crew is approaching BOY. FPA receives a turbulence report that
shows a short stretch of moderate turbulence at FL290 after BOY. It,
therefore, recommends to the crew that they maintain their current
cruise altitude of FL250 until RAP. Note that this recommendation is
based on passenger comfort rather than a savings of time and/or fuel.
The crew must now decide whether to immediately ascend to a
cruising altitude of FL290 and possibly encounter moderate turbulence
or to follow FPA's recommendation and wait until RAP to ascend.
4) The crew is approaching RAP where they are planning to ascend to
FL330. FPA receives another wind update that shows the actual winds
at FL330 are slightly less than the forecasted winds, and the winds at
FL290 will give a marginal savings of fuel and time. It, therefore,
recommends that the crew climb only to FL290 rather than FL330. The
crew must decide, in this borderline case, whether to ascend to FL330
or to ascend to FPA's recommendation of FL290.
5) The crew has just finished their climb at RAP, and their fuel situation
is becoming more serious due to winds less than forecasted and
cruising at lower altitudes than anticipated. Also, the destination
airport weather has been getting progressively worse over time.
FPA notices that the crew must soon make a decision about possibly
deviating around the thunderstorm which they are approaching. For
this event, FPA cannot make a single recommendation. It instead
gives the crew three options - maintain their current path which goes
through the middle of the thunderstorm, vector to the north of the
thunderstorms, or vector to the south of the thunderstorms.
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Maintaining the current path is very risky. The northern deviation is
moderately risky, but does not use an extreme amount of extra fuel.
The southern deviation is the least risky, but it uses a large amount of
extra fuel which could become a problem given the worsening
weather at the destination airport.
6) After the crew has deviated around the thunderstorm, their fuel
situation is a definite problem. FPA receives a report that says the
destination airport, Detroit, has gone below minimums (i.e., it is
closed). It recommends a new destination of Toledo and the same
alternate as before which is Cleveland. The crew must decide whether
to take FPA's recommendation of going to Toledo, whether to stick
with the original alternate and go to Cleveland, or whether to select
an entirely different destination altogether.
2.2 The Flight Plan Advisor (FPA)
A secondary goal of Phase II was to evaluate the FPA system, a flight planning
aid developed by NASA personnel. A detailed description of this system
appears in Taylor and Dammann (1989).
Briefly, this system provided the crew with
1) current weather information,
2) suggestions for better flight plans when one was available, and
3) an explanation of why the new flight plan was better.
The crew had access to current weather information at all times. This
information included
- wind charts at 400rob (24,000 ft.), 300mb (30,000 ft.), and 250rob (35,000
ft.),
- a radar summary chart,
- a significant weather chart which also depicted areas of turbulence, and
- hourly sequence reports, forecasts, and NOTAMs for all airports.
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As an example of these displays, the radar summary chart is shown in Figure
2. Crews could request a hard copy printout of any of these displays.
Besides providing current weather information, FPA also recommended new
flight plans to the crew if it found one that was significantly better than the
current one. To make this recommendation, FPA would first alert the crew
with both a message on the screen and an audio beeping. As soon as the crew
acknowledged the beeping by pressing a button, FPA displayed a general
explanation which included
- the reason for the new flight plan (e.g., better winds, turbulence, or
thunderstorms),
- an abbreviated version of what to do next (e.g., continue at current
altitude rather than climbing as planned), and
- the impact of this flight plan with respect to fuel and time (i.e., did the
fuel burn and time increase, decrease, or remain unchanged).
Also at this time, FPA printed a copy of the new flight plan for the crew.
The FPA system was implemented using Apple Macintoshes and HyperCard
software. During the experimental flights, the experimenter provided the
"intelligence" of the FPA system by tracking the crew's progress along their
route, calculating new flight plans for them, updating the weather
information and sequence reports when appropriate, and triggering the
events. Additional details of the implementation appear in Taylor and
Dammann (1989).
2.3 Full-Mission Simulations
Five three-person crews participated in this study. Each crew consisted of a
captain, first officer, and second officer from the same airline. All participants
were currently qualified to operate a 727. Altogether, the five crews
represented three different airlines. All subjects were paid and were informed
that their responses and actions would remain completely confidential.
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Figure 2. An example FPA display - the radar summary chart.
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Initially, each crew member answered a questionnaire regarding his flying
experience. This questionnaire is shown in Appendix A. Second, crews were
given instruction in the differences between the 727s which their airlines
used and the 727 simulator at NASA Ames.
Third, crews received training on the FPA system. This training consisted of a
demonstration by the experimenter, followed by hands-on problem-solving
by the crew members themselves. During the demonstration and hands-on
problem-solving, the crews participated in two different events where FPA
recommended a new flight plan. At the end of the experiment, all crews were
asked if the amount of training which they received was sufficient. All
agreed that it was.
Fourth, crews participated in the experimental flight from San Francisco to
Detroit. In addition to the information available in a typical 727 cockpit, the
crew also had access to the FPA system. All phases and aspects of the flight
from take-off to top of descent were simulated including ATC and motion.
The crew's original flight plan is shown in Figure 3. The data was collected
using the 727 motion-based simulator at NASA Ames Research Center. The
data included
- audio and video recordings among the crew,
- audio recordings between the crew and ATC,
- a video recording of the FPA screen during the flight and the crew's
interactions with this system,
- the crew's decision for each "event," and
- the time and fuel situation for each event.
At the conclusion of the experimental flight, crew members participated in a
post-flight interview session. This interview focused on what the pilots felt
would be a reasonable design for a flight planning aid and a critique of our
scenario. The interview questions are listed in Appendix B.
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2.4 Data Analysis
As part of the cognitive task analysis, the five videotaped flight sessions were
analyzed for evidence of
established by the flight crew (e.g., detecting when an alternative
flight plan should be considered),
- information accessed by the flight crew to help accomplish various
goals, and
- methods used to evaluate the information gathered.
The results of this analysis were used to build a model of the flight planning
behavior of the crew while enroute.
The videotapes and post-flight interviews were studied for evidence of
- information the crew would have liked FPA to present,
- alternative functions that the crew wished FPA had performed, and
- problems in interacting with FPA.
3. THE ENROUTE FLIGHT PLANNING TASK
Not surprisingly, enroute flight planning is a group activity. The flight crew is
involved, but so are Dispatch and Air Traffic Control (ATC). Perhaps more
significant, however, is how strongly the data indicate that the flight crew
plays a critical role in enroute flight planning. Some members of the aviation
community have suggested that the flight crew needs little in the way of aids
for replanning. They suggest this in the mistaken belief that replanning is
primarily the responsibility of Dispatch. Our data makes it clear that this is a
grossly simplistic view of enroute planning. This data clearly indicates that
flight crews play a critical role in enroute planning.
This section provides evidence of flight crew involvement and also gives
several examples that help us to begin to get "into the minds" of the flight
crews. These examples help us to understand the role of the crew in enroute
flight planning and also help us to begin to identify the types of data and aids
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that could be of value to the crew. Briefly, the data suggests that flight
planning aids could be very useful in assisting both the flight crew and
Dispatch to
- detect the need to re-plan in a timely fashion,
- generate alternative flight plans,
- evaluate these alternative plans, and
- facilitate communications.
3.1 Evidence of Flight Crew Involvement
The simulations provide strong evidence that the flight crew plays a major
role in detecting the need to consider alternative routes. Half way through
the flight, for instance, one crew noted...
"We could have some activity in Detroit, too. I think we're going to want
to go north of that. North or south. It looks like north would be better... I
wonder if we can figure a new route north of where that weather is out
there and request it through the company?"
And at a later point...
"What does it show on our charts as far as when it would be efficient to go
to 33?"
In both cases, it was the flight crew that detected the need to consider an
alternative route or altitude. The results reported here indicate that one
important function of a computerized planning aid would be to help flight
crews (and Dispatch) to detect the need to amend a flight in a timely fashion.
Failure to detect such a need early enough could result in missing the
opportunity to make the best adjustment.
These data, illustrated in the above quotes, also make it clear that the flight
crew generates alternative routes. In some cases, their recommendation is
forwarded to Dispatch for further consideration and approval. In other cases,
the crew makes the change and simply informs Dispatch:
"Normally what we do is we just request to Center for a slight deviation.
But then we also tell Dispatch. We don't always, though."
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Thus, the data indicate that both the flight crew and Dispatch are involved in
generating and evaluating alternative routes. A computerized aid that helps
to develop and evaluate alternative routes could be of value to both parties.
Furthermore, such a system could prove to be a valuable communications
tool between the flight crew and Dispatch:
"That's something that would be real valuable with this type of system,
would be to be able to have a direct request to Dispatch right there via the
system."
3.2 Specific Instances of Flight Planning
Perhaps the clearest way to understand the nature of the flight crews'
involvement in planning is to look at some specific examples. These are
presented below.
Example 1. Fifteen minutes after takeoff, the pilot requested clearance to
climb from FL250 to FL290. ATC denied this request because of other traffic.
In response to this event, "the flight crew did the following:
1) Asked ATC how long they would be at FL250.
2) Noted that they "ought to call Dispatch and tell them we're at a
different altitude," but chose not to call Dispatch yet.
3) Asked themselves, "What do you think our difference in burn would
be at 250?"
4) Determined the differences in fuel burn and time (actual vs. planned)
at the next waypoint - "47.7--we're 200 pounds under."
5) Checked the wind speeds and directions - "Have the winds changed at
all? We're coming up on Mustang. Mustang has winds at 290 of 44
knots."
6) Predicted the extra fuel burn resulting from staying at FL250 until
Battle Mountain (the point at which ATC had indicated they could
probably climb) - "I guess we know we're going to burn some more
fuel staying down here, but probably as much as 500 pounds maybe."
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7) Further evaluated the implications of staying at FL250 - "Twenty-five
minutes down here. That'll let us get to 33 a little ahead of time
because we'll have burned off fuel just a little ahead of time. Yeah.
Possible. I don't know."
8) Planned their next change in path - "Battle Mountain. That's when
I'm hoping to get 29,000."
9) Evaluated this plan by checking the winds at Battle Mountain.
As this example illustrates, the flight crew was extremely active in
considering alternative flight paths. They collected a variety of data to
determine the implications of the unplanned deviation from their route, and
to decide what they should do next. Some of this data involved comparing
actual performance (e.g., fuel burn) with that expected under the original
plan. Other data required making predictions about future performance if the
current altitude was maintained.
Example 2. In the first example, ATC instructions made it necessary for the
pilots to consider the implications of a different route. In this second example
which occurred 54 minutes into the flight, one crew detected data that caused
them to consider a different route for other reasons...
Looking at the radar chart, the co-pilot noted:
"We could have some activity on the way to Detroit, too. I think we're
going to want to go north of that. North or south. It looks like north
would be better."
The crew then proceeded to develop such a plan:
"It seems like maybe we could reroute our flight up above there
[North] rather than wait 'til we get up here... What kinds of VORs are we
looking at then? Should we maybe go to Aberdeen flying up north and
possibly Redwood Falls?"
The pilot then requested such a change:
"We have a routing request we'd like to have you pass on to our
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dispatcher. We'd like to fly Jet 32 to Aberdeen, then let 70 to Badger. We'd
like to remain at FL 250 for the time being."
This example illustrates the fact that the flight crew plays an active role in
detecting the need to consider an alternative plan and in generating the
alternative plan. One potentially valuable function of a computer aid would
be to assist crews (and Dispatch) in detecting such situations as early as
possible, so that all of the alternatives are still available to consider. A
computer aid might also be useful to flight crews if it helped them to generate
alternative plans and evaluate them.
Example 3. In a third situation, one hour and forty-four minutes into the
flight, one crew began to consider alternative altitudes...
"What does it show on our charts as far as when it would be efficient to go
to 33? [answer:] We should be at 33 now. We're at 8,000 below. Between
the two altitudes, there's a difference of about 60 knots...We should be
thinking about going to 33 here soon. Of course, turbulence always
overrules."
Again we see the flight crew taking the initiative to consider an alternative.
A computer aid could clearly help them by providing easy access to the data
and calculations they wanted.
Example 4. Two hours and sixteen minutes into the flight, the same crew as
in Example 2 began to consider the thunderstorm again...
"That looks kinda nasty. We tried to tell them a long time ago we wanted
to go north of that. I'm not wild about going between those things.
There's not 20 miles between them. I vote total deviation. Ask 'era for a
vector around the north side of the weather. How far are we going to have
to go? 100 miles? If we start down, we won't have to go as far out of our
way. Just tell 'ern we want to vector north of the weather and let them
[ATC] do it. We don't have enough information to be that specific.
There's no way we're going to fly into that... Holy shit! There's stuff
behind it, too. Holy Mother!"
This example provides a nice illustration of the role of the crew in detecting a
problem and considering alternatives. It also points out the importance of
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coordination between the crew, ATC and Dispatch. In particular, the crew
noted, "Taking our deviation a lot further back would have made a whole lot
more sense."
Example 5. Two hours and forty-eight minutes into the flight, one crew began
to worry about their destination...
"I have a bad feeling about Detroit. Should have been starting to clear...
The minimum there - we need a half mile... What did they show for the
fuel [the reserve fuel for the new path around the thunderstorm] there?
18.6 - One thousand pounds less than original... I recommend, gentlemen,
if Detroit doesn't look good we go direct to Cleveland and we go to the 100
Bomb Group for dinner, to the restaurant right next to the airport. [The
pilot's joking response:] You wouldn't let that influence your decision,
would you?... Chicago's pretty good. Milwaukee's not bad. Our landing
fuel just gets lower and lower."
Here again we see the flight crew wanting to evaluate their plan. Detroit is
still open, but the trends look unfavorable. In fact, just a few minutes after
this example, the crew received a report that Detroit had dosed.
Example 6. After receiving the bulletin that Detroit was closed, along with a
recommendation to divert to Toledo, this same crew from Example 5
commented...
"Do they expect an improvement in Detroit then? 1/4 mile and rain and
fog... We would have a little time to hold, wouldn't we?... Call Dispatch
and see what they want us to do. Let's see how much we've got in fuel,
how much we can hold at someplace if we wanted to consider that."
In this case, the flight crew is generating an alternative and trying to evaluate
it. An aid to help them evaluate this alternative in terms of fuel
consumption would probably be useful.
4. COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS
The first step in our cognitive task analysis was to evaluate whether or not
our scenario had truly caused the crew to consider replanning their current
18
flight path. Second, we analyzed the crews' performance to determine what
goals were established by the flight crew, what information they accessed to
help them accomplish the various goals, and what methods the crews used to
help them evaluate the information.
4.1 Evaluating the Scenario
The overall planning performances of the flight crews can be summarized in
terms of certain key descriptors including
- which direction they selected to deviate around the thunderstorm,
- which alternate airports they considered, and
- which airport they selected as their final destination.
The crews' decisions at each of these points are shown in Table 1.
This summary indicates that the scenario was in fact successful in inducing
flight planning. The crews all diverted around the area of thunderstorms and
selected alternate destinations. In addition, the more detailed analyses given
in the next section demonstrate that each crew engaged in many planning
activities in response to our scenario.
4.2 Task Analysis of Goals
The flight crew's planning activities can be described in terms of the
following four major goals:
1) Detection of a need to consider an alternate flight plan.
2) Generation of alternative plans.
3) Evaluation of alternative plans that have been generated.
4) Determining what actions have to be taken to carry out a plan.
Each crew's transcript was analyzed to determine the circumstances where
these goals appeared to be activated, and to identify the information used in
achieving the goals. Because the data used to make such inferences consisted
of discourse among the crew members, it is to be expected the crew did not
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Crew
3
4
Table 1.
Direction of Deviation
Around Storm
north
south
north
north
The crews' decisions.
Alternate Airports
Considered
Chicago
Cleveland
Milwaukee
Toledo
Chicago
Cleveland
Milwaukee
Toledo
Chicago
Cleveland
Grand Rapids
Lansing
Milwaukee
Saginaw
Souix Fails
Toledo
Cleveland
Grand Rapids
Lansing
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Toledo
Final
Destination
Toledo
Milwaukee
Milwaukee
Milwaukee
south Chicago
Cleveland
Milwaukee
Toledo
Milwaukee
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mention all of the information which they actually used. Because of the
teamwork required in the cockpit, though, the transcripts appear to provide a
fairly good overall picture of flight planning activities.
4.3 Task Analysis of Information
Several coding categories were developed to indicate the information used by
the flight crews. These consisted of the following:
5° Information on fuel consumption, including
a. the current remaining fuel level,
b. the original estimate of the fuel level at some waypoint,
c. the difference between the actual fuel level and the original
estimate,
d. an updated estimate of the fuel level,
e. the difference between the actuai fuel level and the updated
estimate, and
f. the difference between the original fuel estimate and the updated
estimate.
To generate updated or predicted estimates of fuel consumption, the crews
also considered the weight of the aircraft, power settings, winds aloft and
altitude. They furthermore considered the holding fuel likely to remain
for particular paths.
2. Information on arrival time, including
a. the actual time of arrival at some waypoint,
b. the original estimate of arrival time at some waypoint,
c. the difference between the actual arrival time and the original
estimate,
d. an updated estimate of the arrival time,
e. the difference between the actual arrival time and the updated
estimate, and
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f. the difference between the original estimated arrival time and the
updated estimate.
3. Information on weather, including
a. turbulence,
b. winds aloft,
c. wind components,
d. thunderstorm locations and tops,
e. front locations, and
f. weather at specific airports (ceiling height, precipitation,
temperature-dewpoint spread, visibility).
These weather categories were also checked for trends over time and for
accuracy by checking their own and other aircrafts' experiences at
particular points along the route.
. Information for following their flight plan, including
a. jetways,
b. waypoints,
c. inbound and outbound paths,
d. VOR frequencies, and
e. groundspeeds and airspeeds.
4.4 Task Analysis of Methods
In addition to analyzing the transcripts for goals and information, we also
analyzed the transcripts for the methods used to accomplish each of the
previously mentioned goals and what information was used in each of these
methods.
Methods for the Goal of Detection. Because they are on the scene, and because
they have a primary role in deciding when a flight planning problem exists,
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the crew is constantly monitoring for evidence of a need to consider an
alternate route or destination.
First, the crew routinely monitors fuel consumption and arrival times at
waypoints. This data is compared with original and updated estimates:
"Time 3:46, fuel 446 on board. We're low 600 pounds, an additional 400 for
that period, and one minute late."
They also predict the effects of unplanned route and wind changes on future
arrival times and fuels:
"I guess we know we're going to burn some more fuel staying down here.
But probably as much as 500 pounds maybe."
"We've dipped into our holds a little bit [already]. I think this detour up
here is going to dip into the rest of it."
Second, the crew monitors for unpredicted changes in weather. In this
scenario, the focus is on wind speeds and directions at different altitudes, on
thunderstorm locations and tops and on airport ceilings, precipitation and
temperature-dewpoint spreads. They also monitor for the presence of fronts
and turbulence. In addition to monitoring the actual weather at times during
the flight, the crew checks forecasts and looks at trends over time.
These types of data, then, help the crew to decide whether an alternative
flight plan should be considered. When particular data deviate from
expectations sufficiently, the crew begins to generate alternatives as illustrated
below.
Methods for the Goals of Plan Generation and Evaluation Having detected a
need (or possible need) to replan, the flight crews began to generate and
evaluate alternatives. Often they would develop complete alternative plans
before requesting assistance or concurrence from Dispatch.
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As one example of a specific planning episode, we can look at Crew #2 during
their first planning episode. At 4:01 (the flight began at 3:00), this crew
initiated their first planning episode. Prior to this time, they had been held at
FL250, below their scheduled altitude. In this episode, they evaluate whether
they should request a higher altitude at some point soon...
"What's the maximum altitude we can get now? What are the winds up
there? We have climb capability up to 33. What's the altitude where we'll
get the best nautical miles per thousand pounds? The tail wind increases
as we go up. Significantly? Better tail winds lower but not significantly.
Ask the Dispatcher what if we go up at this point. Request a flight for 33
from Mallard City on this same routing. I'd say go up... Here's 33 and
we're getting better tail winds up here all along and we're getting better
fuel consumption up there."
This episode illustrates one type of planning script - attempting to find the
best altitude along a given path. The factors considered in making this
judgment include the aircraft's maximum altitude for its weight, the winds at
different altitudes and fuel efficiency for the aircraft at different altitudes.
As a second example, we can look at this same crew during their third
planning episode. At 4:37 this crew noted thunderstorms along their path...
"See that one near the Minnesota-Iowa border. Tops 390."
At 5:07 they asked ATC,
"Are you controlling that area over the Minnesota-South Dakota border?
We had a forecast of some thunderstorms there. Any reports?"
At 5:15 they decided to seriously consider alternate routes...
"What would be the shortest deviation? To the north, wouldn't it? Well,
the wind would be pushing it to the south so we should go to the left.
Yeah."
"If we're already 200 miles away and it's that strong, you know we should
start doing something about it."
"When do you think we ought to start detouring?"
"Do you have any reports on tops? Any traffic this way? Which way have
they been going through this?"
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"Mason City is just right smack in the middle of it. It's pretty extensive.
It's pretty solid."
"What do you say we head to the left...We're going to have to go up north
of Minneapolis. Why not just start here and miss the whole thing. Worst
thing comes to worst, we'll land in Milwaukee."
"Actually, it would be smoother down there [a southern deviation].
There's almost nothing there. Sioux Falls-Des Moines is J45 and then after
we get to Des Moines we can turn back in. J45 Des Moines-that's the south
route and then how about... Des Moines direct Badger. What will this give
us at landing?... So we've used all our holding [fuel] then...What's the
new revised landing time?"
"I think we can save some money by not going up to Badger. Some time,
too. What do you think? We'll go Des Moines, Northbrook, Pullman.
It'd save us going all the way here and all the way back."
This episode, then, represents a second type of planning script, with the goal
of finding an alternate horizontal path. In this case, the crew generates three
alternative paths and evaluates them in terms of turbulence, storm activity
(location, tops and direction of movement), fuel consumption, and landing
time. They also consider the availability of an alternate landing site if needed.
All of the specific planning episodes for each crew are described in Appendix
C.
Methods for the Goal of Determining if They Were Following a Flight Plan.
Having selected a flight plan, the crews had to collect certain data to ensure
that they were following it. This included
- VOR frequencies and the inbound/outbound directions associated with
particular waypoints,
- the jetways they were supposed to follow when going between
waypoints, and the altitudes and power settings to be used along these
jetways,
- the time and distance to a particular waypoint so that they could prepare
to take appropriate actions, and
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actual and predicted groundspeeds and their differences, so that they
could make adjustments in power settings if needed.
The primary insight provided by this study regarding this goal is that such
information is used with great frequency. Given this high frequency of use,
such information needs to be made readily accessible.
4.5 Cognitive Task Analysis Summary
Our analysis provides evidence of a number of goals that the flight crew must
deal with. Included are
1) detecting a situation where replanning is desirable or necessary,
2) generating alternative paths for consideration,
3) evaluating the (actual or predicted) results of following a particular
path,
4) communicating with Dispatch and ATC, and
5) collecting data and performing calculations to help accomplish goals 1-
3 above.
The preceding subsections serve to indicate the kinds of data and inferences
used to trigger and support these goals. The transcripts provide, for example,
evidence of a number of different types of plans and planning situations. To
avoid turbulence, for instance, we found evidence of plans involving changes
in altitude, reductions in speed, or changes in the route.
It is clear that the 727 cockpit used in this simulation does not adequately
support the planning activities of flight crews we observed. To our
knowledge, while much improved, more recent cockpit designs still fail to
meet many of the needs evidenced by this cognitive task analysis. There is a
clear need to develop information displays that support the different types of
problems that initiate planning episodes, and support the different types of
plans that flight crews develop.
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5. EVALUATION OF FPA
Why study pilots' flight planning performance in the simulator? Why
analyze this performance data to find evidence of the goals and reasoning
processes used by pilots to re-plan flights? Isn't what we need to do to help
the flight crew obvious to anyone knowledgeable about aviation?
The data from this study make it clear that it is not "obvious" how to design a
useful flight planning aid. We need better insights into the planning
performances of pilots before we design such aids.
In particular, FPA was designed by NASA staff without the benefit of any
performance data or cognitive task analyses. The results are well
summarized by one pilot's evaluation three hours into the flight...
"You know what I feel about this machine right now? I think they've got
a great piece of equipment, but they need to figure out how to use it."
The results from our Phase I study demonstrated that there are at least four
important issues to consider when designing interfaces to cooperative
decision aids (Galdes, Smith & Chappell, 1989). These issues include
the role of the system (e.g., a critic, a consultant, or a "what if" system),
the amount of explanation necessary for pilots to accept the system,
the specific information that pilots want/need from such a system, and
the range of individual differences that the system must accommodate.
In Phase II, we again saw these same issues arise over and over again,
primarily because the design of FPA was lacking with respect to how pilots felt
these issues should be handled.
5.1 The Role of the System
As stated previously, recent research (Rouse, Geddes & Curry, 1987; Rouse,
Rouse & Hammer, 1982; Woods, 1986) has shown that experienced users do
not want knowledge-based systems which act as autonomous decision makers
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because these systems do not give their users enough control. Yet, this is the
classic AI paradigm for expert systems (Woods, 1986) and was also the basic
paradigm for FPA. An alternative, and more acceptable, paradigm which
keeps pilots in the loop is a knowledge-based system which acts as a
cooperative decision aid rather than an autonomous decision maker.
In this experimental setup, FPA informed the crew when it found a better
flight plan. It did not, however, allow the crew to cooperate in the decision-
making process by possibly allowing them to ask FPA "What would happen
if...?" or "Calculate the most fuel efficient flight plan that does not go above
FL330 (because there is other traffic there)." This lack of cooperation was the
most common complaint about the FPA system, and was mentioned by all
five crews.
Some typical comments during the post-flight discussion were the following:
"Here's the thing I have at the top of my list - I think you've got a great
machine here, but the thing I found most frustrating was that you
couldn't ask for a new flight plan." (Crew #1)
"We should be able to ask 'what-if.' The system should also tell you if it
wouldn't recommend that route and why. (Crew #2)
"I would like to be able to change the cruise speed - the mach number -
and see what would happen, see if slowing down would give me a little
extra fuel when I landed." (Crew #3)
"I found myself a couple of times turning around to the machine and
going, 'Speak to me! We need some ideas here.'... You couldn't make it sa._
anything." (Crew #4)
"There wasn't any way to request a new flight plan. Sometimes we made a
decision of what we wanted to do, but then we couldn't request a new
flight plan and get information about it." (Crew #5)
5.2 Explanations
For each recommended flight plan, FPA gave two explanations - a very
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general one and a more detailed specific one. Each explanation described
- the reason for the new flight plan,
- FPA's recommended changes to the current flight plan, and
- how this new flight plan compared to the current one in terms of fuel
and time.
Examples of the general and specific explanations for Event #2, described in
Section 2.1, axe shown in Figures 4 and 5.
When FPA found a new flight plan for the crew, it alerted them with both
audio and visual signals. When the crew acknowledged these signals, FPA
would automatically display the brief, general explanation. In every instance
after reading this general explanation, the crew then immediately requested
the specific one.
All of the crews liked the explanations, but felt that one explanation would be
enough. When asked if they preferred the general or the specific, detailed
version, all crews responded that the specific one was better. One crew
member came up with a way to keep both...
"One [explanation] would be enough. You could have the specific
explanation, then have the general explanation information bold or
highlighted in some way in this more detailed information. That way,
you could look at the fine details when you had time, but you could also
just get the information in a glance if you were in a hurry." (Crew #3)
It is important, however, to note two points about the adequacy of these
explanations. First, some pilots stated that the explanations were adequate
because the pilots could check the explanations themselves using the raw
data. This implies that we cannot provide an explanation capability without a
mechanism which allows the pilots to check the system's reasoning. Second,
although the explanation format was adequate for the role which FPA played,
it may not provide the pilots with enough information if the system also
supports a "what-if" role.
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General
Explanation
Reason for new flight plan:
Winds better at FL250 than at FL290.
FPA recommends:
Continue at FL250.
Impact of new flight plan:
Trip fuel consumption: Decreased
Flight plan time: Increased
Figure 4. FPA's general explanation for Event #2.
3O
Specific
Explanation
Reason for new flight plan:
Tailwind component at FL250 is 68 kts better than
at FL290 between BAM and BOY.
FPA recommends:
Continue at FL250 until BOY, then climb to FL290.
Impact of new flight plan:
Trip fuel consumption: Decreased by 400 Ibs.
Flight plan time: Increased by 8 min.
Figure 5. FPA's specific explanation for Event #2.
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5.3 Information that Pilots Want
All of the pilots raved about the real-time weather information provided by
FPA...
"I like the real-time weather information. It helps us keep more in
touch." (Crew #4)
They also commented that the weather data was especially important for
confirming FPA's recommendations...
"Pilots aren't going to accept these new flight plans without being able to
verify it themselves... I think you're going to wi_nt to verify it yourself
with some of the data." (Crew #I)
Some of the information that pilots felt was missing from FPA included
1) trends in the weather...
"We would like to see not only the current weather [sequence report] but
we also like to have access to what it's been over the last few hours. We
want to see trends." (Crew #2)
2) being able to specify the time-of-arrival...
"Time-of-arrival is becoming more and more important. For example,
O'Hare is trying to get everyone to land as close as possible to their
scheduled time-of-arrival. They want pilots to speed up or slow down
during their flight so that their arrival time is accurate. I would think that
for this FPA then you would want to be able to give it both a destination
and a time of arrival." (Crew #1)
3) having the system highlight the arrival time in the forecasts (Crew #2),
4) information about delays over specific airports such as Chicago (Crew #2)
5) information about the distance to the closest airport...
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"We couldn't find out how far Toledo was from anything. We wanted to
be able to ask for what airport was closest. We're in a holding pattern and
different airports are closer at different times." (Crew #4)
6) allowing the crew to put parameters into the system such as
groundspeed and shortest time...
"We want to be able to put parameters into the system such as fastest
groundspeed, different flight levels, shortest time, and least fuel burn for
economy reasons." Experimenter's Question: When would you ask for
shortest time as opposed to least fuel burn? Crew's Response: "Well, for
example, you might see some weather moving along and you know that if
you don't get there within the next hour then you probably won't be able
to fly in there at all. Or you might have 150 people on board and you're
trying to get them all on the last connecting flights out for the night. You
know that if you don't make it, the company is going to have to put up 150
people and that's going to cost more than burning some extra fuel to get
there fast." (Crew #4)
7) providing a zoom feature that would allow the crew to switch between a
general overview of a large area and a detailed picture of a smaller area
(all crews).
5.4 Allowing for Individual Differences
Whatever the final design of any decision aid, it should certainly allow for
individual differences. Each crew in our study selected a slightly different
route even though all crews began with the same original flight plan, began
with the same amount of fuel, and encountered the same weather and traffic
obstacles along the way. FPA did not provide this feature.
As one example of where individual differences are important, the
experimenter asked one crew member if he would want to be responsible for
picking his own cruise speed or would he rather have a system calculate it for
him. His response was, "Personally, I'd want to pick it myself, but that's my
way of operating." (Crew #3) Other crew members of different crews,
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however, stated that the system could probably do a better job of picking the
most efficient cruise speed so let the machine do the work.
In addition to individual differences/tolerances between pilots, pilots also
change their own tolerances with respect to the current situation. As one
pilot put it,
"For example, if a pilot feels tight on fuel then he may want the system to
inform him of better flight plans when "better" equates to as little as 1000
lbs. of fuel savings. If a pilot doesn't feel tight on fuel then he would want
a flight plan that is much better before it [the system] interrupted him."
(Crew #1)
5.5 FPA Evaluation Summary
FPA was capable of doing some useful computations, but the way in which it
interacted with pilots greatly reduced its usefulness. The most important
deficiency of FPA was that the crew needed and wanted the ability to explore
paths they were interested in, and not just the paths FPA recommended.
They wanted a system that played the role of a cooperative decision aid - one
that would allow them to say, "Speak to me!" and it would speak back.
Furthermore, much of the data and calculations needed by pilots to replan
flights simply wasn't available to them using FPA. This reaction is best
summarized by one crew member who stated in the post-flight interview,
"I started out thinking there was too much stuff that you didn't need.
Then, as you got into the program, I was demanding more data and I was
demanding more data than what the system was able to provide. I wanted
more data on comparing the flight levels - should I go up, should I go
down?" (Crew #4)
6. CONCLUSIONS
What is the value of a study such as this? First, the videotapes are an
incredibly rich source of insights into the flight planning activities of pilots.
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Anyone interested in building flight planning aids would be well advised to
view these (or similar) tapes.
Second, the cognitive task analysis has identified the types of goals pilots
establish and the information used to help accomplish these goals. These
results are critical if we hope to build effective computer aids.
Third, the results are strongly suggestive of the role that the flight planning
aid should play. It may be useful to build a system that suggests good
alternatives. At least as important, if not more important, however, is the
need for a system that
1) Helps pilots to detect the need for replanning in a timely fashion.
2) Aids pilots in generating alternative paths.
3) Provides computations to the pilots to aid in evaluating alternatives.
4) Allows the pilot to say "what if I took this path" to the computer,
which then helps him to evaluate that alternative.
5) Facilitates communications between the flight crew and Dispatch.
In short, building effective flight planning aids will not be a trivial matter.
We must identify the needs pilots actually have and how they think about
flight planning. Such insights can then form the foundation for generating
creative designs that are helpful. Data from studies such as this provide us
with a more objective basis for building such a foundation.
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APPENDIX A - PRE-FLIGHT QUESTIONNAIRE
Subject number (experimenter will provide this)
Age FAA Medical Certificate Class
Visual restrictions.:'
Cockpit position: Captain First Officer Second Officer
Currently flying (aircraft, position)
Total flying time
Time in cockpit position Time last 90 days
Please characterize your operational flying during the last 90 days:
Types of aircraft flown, approximate amount of flight time for each:
What % of time is military
airline
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APPENDIX B - POST-FLIGHT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
EXPLANATION OF INTELLIGENT FLIGHT PLANNING AID
What I want to do now is get some feedback and comments from all of you
about your experiences interacting with this system. Again, I'd like to
emphasize that this is only an experimental system at this stage, and it is not
necessarily a system that we would put in the cockpit. The purpose is to give
you an idea of what intelligent systems could do in the cockpit. It's meant to
start you thinking about situations where you would find this kind of system
useful and how you would want to interact with such a system.
In addition to giving you updated weather data, and giving you suggestions
for new flight paths, a future version of FPA could also do things such as:
1) keep track of information from ATC
- ride reports
2) or evaluate your own decisions
- you choose an alternate airport, if there is another airport
significantly better then it tells you that, otherwise it doesn't say
anything
What we want to know is what would _ really like the system to do.
GENERAL DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:
1) If you had such an intelligent system, how much of the underlying system
do you think you'd need to know about in order to understand it or trust
it? Were there specific events where you didn't trust FPA? In general,
did you trust FPA? Why or why not?
2) What kind of roles do you see for such a system?
- critic?
- give you an answer?
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a giant number cruncher?
Does the role vary with the situation? with the amount of workload?
3) Did you like just getting one suggestion in most cases or would you like to
see options in all cases? If the system did give you options most of the
time, what kind of information would you want presented so that you
could decide which option is best for you?
4) Did you like the way that the system alerted you to a new flight plan? Did
it get your attention? Did you like the audio alarm?
5) If you had such a system in the cockpit, where would you like to see it
placed and how would you like it to alert you?
6) Would you prefer a color system to one that is black and white?
7)
8)
Did you like getting explanations from FPA? Were those explanations
too short or too long? Did you like having two, a general and a more
specific one, or would a single explanation have been enough? Did the
three distinct fields make sense? Would you have preferred different
fields from "Reason for change", "FPA recommends", and "Impact" - in
other words, is there other information that you wanted to see but was
missing from these explanations?
Did you find the weather information useful? Did you like it in this
"raw" form or would you have preferred a more intelligent form that
would allow you to ask some questions - for example, for the wind charts,
have options to highlight what has changed from the last wind chart or
what changes have caused a new flight plan to be generated or click on
portions of the US map and have it blow up that area and show more
detail? Are there any other "intelligent" data displays that you would
like to see?
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9) Did you find the print option necessary? Would you have a preferred a
system where you could go back to earlier displays or did you like having
a hard copy?
10) If you could put all of the information that you wanted on a visual
display, what would it look like? Would it be something similar to FPA
or something completely different?
11) In what kinds of situations do you think this information about flight
plans and their implications is most likely to be helpful to you? What
kinds of situations can you imagine? In other words, if we wanted to
create different scenarios to study how people responded to having to
replan, what are the different circumstances to consider where it's really
necessary/desirable to take another course?
12) Are there other kinds of information you'd want in these different
circumstances to help you do some good planning? Is there any
information that we missed?
13) Would you prefer to get this information verbally from someone on the
ground like a Airink or ATC or would you prefer to have it visually
displayed and always be allowed to read it off that way? Would one
format feel better than the other?
14) Can you think of situations where this system or the extra information
would get in your way or where you'd rather not have to mess with it?
That is, can you think of times when this additional feature might
actually interfere with your primary job of flying the aircraft?
15) When something like these situations occur, do you generally already
have in mind what is probably a good o r possible solution? If so, suppose
that the computer displayed several possible solutions and the one you
were thinking of wasn't in the computer's list. How would you react to
4O
16)
that? What would you like to be able to do in such a situation?
In terms of the general simulation here, did you feel that it was fairly
realistic? Are there any aspects of the simulation that you can think of
that would make it more realistic? How about in terms of the actual
scenario - did it seem fairly realistic?
17) If you could only have three or four buttons of information, which ones
would you keep, which would you throw away, and which might you add
that weren't there today for you?
18) Suppose you hid a choice of two options for how this system would be
implemented. The first is a person on the ground who acts as a special
ground service giving you all of this information that we've been talking
about. They can put up displays as necessary so the communication isn't
strictly over a phone line. The other option is to have a computer system
that's providing the information. This system could be in the plane or
on the ground. If you had a choice between those two, would you rather
be dealing with a human or with a computer system? Why?
19) Are there any other comments you would like to make in terms of the
study such as how it was run or comments about the scenarios chosen?
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APPENDIX C - PLANNING EPISODES FOR ALL CREWS
CREW #1
Planning Episode A. At 3:24 (the flight began at 3:00), this crew began
considering the implications of the request by ATC that they stay at FL250.
They noted that this would burn up some extra fuel and began to consider
when they should try to climb to FL330...
"That'll let us get to 33 a little ahead of time because we'll have burned off
fuel just a little ahead of time."
As part of this consideration they also looked at the winds aloft for different
altitudes...
"I'm going to look at the wind chart and see if I can pick that out."
Based on such data, they elected to stay at FL250.
Planning Episode B. At 3:54 the crew then noted the line of thunderstorms
and began to consider possible deviations...
"We're going to want to go north of that. North or south. It looks like
north would probably be better...I guess when we get closer in we can turn
the radar on and take a better look."
"What we normally do, we wait'll we get up close and we say we want to
go north of the weather and they give us a radar vector. It's showing our
path going right through some thunderstorms. It seems like maybe we
could re-route our flight up there [north] rather than wait 'til we get up
here and get a radar vector. If we call the company, they can send us a new
fight plan. What kind of VORs are we looking at then. Should we maybe
Aberdeen flying up north and possibly Redwood Falls?... We have a
routing request we'd like to have you pass on to our Dispatcher. We'd like
to fly Jet 32 Aberdeen, Jet 70 to Badger. We'd like to remain at flight level
250 for the time being."
This episode illustrates the considerable amount of planning done by the
flight crew. They are playing a significant role in deciding when an
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alternative plan should be considered, and in generating details of an
alternative. In evaluating this alternative plan, they considered a number of
factors...
"Landing fuel will be decreased by a thousand pounds...We added 10
minutes. It's going to cut on our hold fuel quite a bit. Ask him what the
tops are. It shows turbulence in Wyoming, too. Check the wind chart."
They did not receive approval of their alternate plan soon enough.
Consequently, at 5:16 the crew decided to request a deviation from ATC...
"Ask them for a vector around the north side of the weather. How far are
we going to have to go? A hundred miles. If we start down we won't
have to go as far out of our way. Just tell 'em we want to vector north of
the weather and let them [ATC] do it. We don't have enough information
to be that specific."
This request was initiated by their conclusion that
"It's a good possibility those holes could close up before we get there."
They chose the northern route because
"...looks like Gopher'd be the better way to go as far as fuel burn and time.
On the radar I don't see any significant difference."
They also noted the importance of making timely decisions...
"...taking our deviation a lot further back would have made a whole lot
more sense."
Planning Episode C. At 4:42 this crew again began to consider a higher
altitude (as they were doing in Episode A). This time, the change was in part
motivated by turbulence they had encountered...
"Think it would smooth out if we went up higher?... It shows more
turbulence up higher."
They continue this episode, considering other factors...
"What does it show on our charts as far as when it would be efficient to go
to 33?... Between the two altitudes, there's a difference of about 60 knots...
at 33 we'd be 48 knots better... We should be thinking about going to 33
here soon. 'Course turbulence always overrules.., since our fuel is holding
now, I don't see anything to worry about now."
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Planning Episode D. At 5:41 the crew checked the forecast for Detroit and
Cleveland and noted,
"The weather keeps going down, doesn't it?"
At 5:48 one crew member commented,
"I have a bad feeling about Detroit. Should have been starting to clear...
The minimum there, we need 1/2 mile. So far it would work. What did
they show for fuel there? 18.6. One thousand pounds less than original."
At 5:59 another crew member stated,
"I recommend, gentlemen, if Detroit doesn't look good, we go to
Cleveland."
At 6:03 it was noted,
"Chicago's pretty good.
lower and lower."
Milwaukee - not bad. Our landing fuel just gets
At 6:05 they were informed that Detroit was below minimums and that they
should consider Toledo. They checked Toledo weather, and then commented,
"We would have a little time to hold [at Detroit], wouldn't we? If that
weather's down, there's probably not a good chance it's gonna come up
anyway, huh? Call Dispatch and see what they want us to do. Let's see
how much we've got in fuel, how much we can hold at someplace if we
wanted to consider that... We've got enough time [at Toledo] to make it on
one turn... How much fuel does it take to go from Toledo to Cleveland?"
Again we see the flight crew playing an important role in the replanning
process.
CREW #2
Planning Episode A. At 4:01 this crew initiated their first planning episode.
Prior to this time, they had been held at FL250, below their scheduled altitude.
In this episode, they evaluate whether they should request a higher altitude at
some point soon...
"What's the maximum altitude we can get now? What are the winds up
there? We have climb capability up to 33. What's the altitude where we'll
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get the best nautical miles per thousand pounds? The tail wind increases
as we go up. Significantly? Better tail winds lower but not significantly.
Ask the Dispatcher what if we go up at this point. Request a flight for 33
from Mallard City on this same routing. I'd say go up... Here's 33 and
we're getting better tail winds up here all along and we're getting better
fuel consumption up there."
This episode illustrates one type of planning script - attempting to find the
best altitude along a given path. The factors considered in making this
judgment include the aircraft's maximum altitude for its weight, the winds at
different altitudes and fuel efficiency for the aircraft at different altitudes.
Planning Episode B. At 5:05, the aircraft has gone to FL290, but the crew again
considers an alternative altitude...
"To stay at this altitude, we need a tail wind component of about 13 knots
to be favorable. At this weight they recommend 33. We've got better than
that [a difference of 13 knots.] We're 44. We're better off at 29 and saving
money and everything else than being, at 33."
This episode, then, serves to make it clear that the wind components
(headwinds and tailwinds) are of direct importance in considering alternate
altitudes.
Planning Episode C. At 4:37 this crew noted thunderstorms along their path...
"See that one near the Minnesota-Iowa border. Tops 390."
At 5:07 they asked ATC,
"Are you controlling that area over the Minnesota-South Dakota border?
We had a forecast of some thunderstorms there. Any reports?"
At 5:15 they decided to seriously consider alternate routes...
"What would be the shortest deviation? To the north, wouldn't it? Well,
the wind would be pushing it to the south so we should go to the left.
Yeah."
"If we're already 200 miles away and it's that strong, you know we should
start doing something about it."
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"When do you think we ought to start detouring?"
"Do you have any reports on tops? Any traffic this way? Which way have
they been going through this?"
"Mason City is just right smack in the middle of it. It's pretty extensive.
It's pretty solid."
"What do you say we head to the left... We're going to have to go up north
of Minneapolis. Why not just start here and miss the whole thing. Worst
thing comes to worst, we'll land in Milwaukee."
"Actually, it would be smoother down there [a southern deviation].
There's almost-nothing there. Sioux Falls-Des Moines is J45 and then after
we get to Des Moines we can turn back in. J45 Des Moines - that's the
south route and then how about... Des Moines direct Badger. What will
this give us at landing?... So we've used all our holding [fuel] then...
What's the new revised landing time?"
"I think we can save some money by not going up to Badger. Some time,
too. What do you think? We'll go Des Moines, Northbrook, Pullman.
It'd save us going all the way here and all the way back."
Episode C, then, represents a second type of planning script, with the goal of
finding an alternate horizontal path. In this case, the crew generates three
alternative paths, and evaluates them in terms of turbulence, storm activity
(location, tops and direction of movement), fuel consumption and landing
time. They also consider the availability of an alternate landing site if needed.
Planning Episode D. At 5:40, the crew notes that the weather at Detroit is
deteriorating...
"400, overcast. It's going down."
They then began to evaluate alternative destinations...
"We've got 21,000 pounds. I'm going to have about 10,000 pounds at
touchdown. I'm going to check Milwaukee. We go by Milwaukee, we're
going to make a good check on the Detroit weather. If it doesn't look good,
we'll go to Milwaukee. The hell with it. We don't have any holding fuel
or anything now. 'Cause Cleveland isn't exactly good - 600 overcast... It
was 800 overcast. That's going down."
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At 6:04 they again evaluated their alternatives...
"Detroit - 200 overcast, 1/4 mile, rain, fog. Okay, it's decision time. What
are the minimums for two-one? I think we're going to Milwaukee. Look
at that thing at Cleveland... Get the Dispatcher and tell him we're thinking
about going to Milwaukee. We can load up with gas there and go on.
O'Hare wouldn't be bad. O'Hare is 5000 overcast. Milwaukee - we won't
get delayed as long.., check that Toledo weather... The weather's not that
swift at Toledo either. 52-50 is the temperature-dewpoint spread so I'd go
to Milwaukee."
Thus, Episode D provides us with further evidence of how information is
used in a third script - selecting a new destination (because of bad weather at
the scheduled landing site).
CREW #3
Planning Episode A. At 3:27, this crew begins to consider alternative
altitudes. They begin to explore the wind patterns...
"Right about Reno it shows the wind at 320. We've actually got a tail
wind."
And comment,
"These flight plans ought to have the different fuel burns at different
altitudes at different times."
No action was taken as a direct result, however.
Planning Episode B. At 3:49 this crew notes the thunderstorms along their
path, stating:
"We're gonna be in trouble when we get to South Dakota. Yeah. We're
gonna go either north or south from the looks of it."
Again, no action was taken.
Planning Episode C. At 4:21, the crew begins to worry about the weather at
their destination...
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"We'll have 11,000 when we get to Detroit.
much below 11,000. What do you think?
got there."
I don't want to start getting
No, not with the weather we've
This leads them to startexploring alternatives...
"Alternate Cleveland. Cleveland is worse than Detroit. That's 0400
weather.., any other ideas? Grand Rapids, Chicago, Saginaw. Actually,
we're going to be going right over the top of Milwaukee. I was thinking
that as we get down in the Detroit area and they start vectoring us around
we might need someplace close likeToledo or Saginaw... Actually, Grand
Rapids would be good 'cause itsgot a long runway and light trafficand it's
not too far."
Planning Episode D. At 4:30 they run into some turbulence. They briefly
consider going up but decide not to because
"Supposedly there's worse turbulence up higher. It's not bad yet [at their
current altitude]."
Planning Episode E. At 4:57 the crew again considers changing altitudes...
"We may need to go up to 33 just to see around this weather as we go
along here."
Planning Episode F. At 5:11 we see evidence of a new planning script, one in
which the focus is on the effects of speed on fuel consumption...
"You're going a little fast. You'll burn up your reserve fuel."
Note that later at 5:23 after Episode G, they conclude,
"That brings us down to 10.3. Why don't you bring this thing down to
save us some fuel."
Planning Episode G. At 5:17, the crew begins to worry about the line of
thunderstorms...
"Looks like we need to go one way or the other. It's about a tie... Want to
take the northern route? The only reason I suggest that is I think it's a
little more direct flying to Detroit."
Planning Episode H. Worried about fuel consumption, at 5:31 this crew again
worries about their altitude...
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"I can't believe we can't get a better burn at a higher altitude as light as we
are... It's real doubtful we're better off down here than at 33. But we might
as well stay here. They say the winds are a lot stronger."
Planning Episode I. At 5:46 the crew considers minor deviations to their
route...
"We're running a little short on fuel. If you [ATC] arrange any vectors
toward Detroit, we'd appreciate it."
Planning Episode J. At 6:04 they learn that Detroit is below minimums. They
conclude,
"I don't think Toledo's so hot... We're still real close to Grand Rapids. I'm
beginning to like Milwaukee more and more all the time... Milwaukee's
real good - 6000 overcast."
They make their decision and inform ATC,
"We have no holding fuel left. We'd like to land at Milwaukee."
CREW #4
Planning Episode A. This crew simply accepted the request from ATC to stay
at FL250. It wasn't until 4:23 that they considered changing altitudes, and that
was because they encountered turbulence...
"Did it say where the turbulence was? From 21 to 37."
They stayed at FL250 since there was no indication that the turbulence would
be less at another altitude.
Planning Episode B. At 4:33, the crew does some very general advance
planning, noting the possibility that they may have to land at an alternate
airport...
"Let's call Dispatch and tell him that we're advising him that we're down
to flight plan fuel and that we stayed down at 250, moderate turbulence at
29, and that if there's any change in our destination or if the altitude or if
the weather at our alternate deteriorates any more we're gonna have to
stop and get some gas someplace."
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Plannin_ Episode C. At 5:01 the crew does a little more advance planning...
"I'm trying to see how much closer Toledo is than Cleveland, just in case
Dispatch falls asleep."
Planning Episode D. At 5:10 the crew begins to respond to the line of
thunderstorms along their path...
"You want to deviate to the north. Well, I'm thinking, since we got to go
south anyway, maybe south might be the way we want to go. It'd save us
some gas 'cause we've got exactly 24 grand worth of gas right now."
"We're getting awful close to that. We're going to have to turn sometime.
It's time to make a move."
"How high can we go? Can we make 37? Ask Center what kind of ride
reports he's had. Ask him what kind of ride reports at 29 and 33."
"It looks to me like the best way to go is to go right down to Des Moines.
Yeah, if these things don't move too far south."
"If you go south to Des Moines, decrease 1500 pounds. I suggest we go
north... That's 800 pounds."
"Let's take a look at the winds."
"Let's see if we can go up to 33 and miss some of this. Any ride reports?"
Because they are low on fuel, one factor influencing the choice of a north or
south deviation is the availability of an alternate destination...
"Got one pound, get to hold no time. Why don't you look up
Minneapolis weather. Any specials on Detroit or Cleveland?"
They then continue to consider the best altitude for the deviation...
"You got time to compare the wind at this altitude and 29?... Ask him if
he's got any top [of the thunderstorm] reports."
Finally, they decide to deviate north.
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Planning Evisode E. At 5:34, the crew is concerned about their fuel level. As a
result they decide to slow down...
"We're going about 8.4. Want to pull her back a touch, save some gas?"
Planning Episode F. At 5:41 they again begin to consider alternate
destinations...
"If we check our fuel at Badger, what's the next suitable alternate? Grand
Rapids."
Planning Episode G. At 5:43, in response to turbulence, they consider revising
their flight plan by slowing down...
"If it gets any rougher, I'll slow down to 7.8."
Planning Episode H. At 5:45, the crew begins to get seriously concerned about
their fuel levels...
"We're into our FAR 6000 pounds. Okay. Let's shut the engine heat off.
Anybody got any ideas how we can recover that 800 pounds? What was
the wind at 29? Twenty knots difference. How about we talk them into
changing the alternate to Toledo? It's closer... Cleveland is better [in terms
of weather] than Toledo, but Toledo is closer."
"Call Dispatch and tell him we're 400 pounds below the required."
"How about something north of Detroit? How about Lansing?"
• Planning Episode I. At 5:58 the crew looks for another way to conserve fuel...
"Try to cut the corner at O'Dale. Save a little bit there."
They request permission from ATC to do so.
Planning Episode [. At 6:03, they learn that Detroit is below minimums.
They first consider Toledo...
"Let's go see the Mudhens. Anybody got a Toledo plate?"
At Badger, however, ATC tells them they must hold because of heavy traffic
into Toledo. Their response is to...
"Tell him we've got a critical fuel state and we can't accept holding.
We've got 14.4 now. We can hold a couple of minutes. What amount of
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fuel do you want to leave Badger with?"
"What's the best holding altitude? The holding speed, we weigh now
about 142, would be about 223."
Because ATC can't release them from the holding pattern soon enough, they
decide to go to Milwaukee instead of Toledo...
"Take a look and see what the Milwaukee weather is. How far is
Cleveland? Farther than Toledo. How far is Milwaukee? We're right
over the top of Milwaukee. I know a good restaurant in Milwaukee."
They check with Dispatch to see what he recommends...
"Call Atlanta... Tell him we're considering going into Milwaukee... He
says, yeah, let me know what you do. Typical Dispatch."
Finally they decide to land at Milwaukee.
CREW #5
Planning Episode A. At 3:36, Crew #5 noted that they were consuming more
fuel than planned because they were being held at FL250. They therefore
investigated going to a higher altitude assuming that it would be more fuel
efficient since their original flight planned called for this higher altitude...
"Fuel is 42.2. We're running behind on gas, a little behind on time. Not
too much. What kind of speed are we doing?"
"We're probably not at the optimum. We should be at 29. The flight
plan's at 29. We'll call them [ATC] and see if we can get 29."
Planning Episode B. At 4:14 they note that they are behind schedule and
below the scheduled ground speed. Consequently, they increase their speed...
"We're about three minutes late."
"Our winds are northwest."
"Why don't we take it up to about 320. That should bring our
groundspeed closer in line."
52
Planning Eoisode C. At 4:31 they consider going higher but decide not to
because of reported turbulence at the higher altitudes...
"Because of the turbulence, why don't we just hold with what we've got."
Planning Episode D. At 4:56 they again debate going up to FL290...
"We have to make a decision in 17 miles? Uh oh."
They decide to go up as scheduled and proceed to determine a good power
setting...
"And we're gonna probably need an EPR for 29."
Planning Episode E. At 5:07, they begin to consider the potential implications
of their fuel consumption...
"What kind of minimum fuel do you want to land with at Detroit? We
could call Dispatch for anticipated delays over Detroit. It looks to me like
we won't hold. We're down to five minutes of hold fuel. We'll make one
pass over Detroit and if that doesn't work we'll go right over to
Cleveland."
Planning Episode F. At 5:10 they note that there are
"...some cells right above Sioux Falls. Are we going to have to go around
that?"
As an alternative, they explore the possibility of going above the storm...
"Wonder what the tops are on that. Might be better to go up. Turbulence
might not be as bad. No steep gradients."
Planning Episode G. At 5:16 they again worry about weather at their
destination...
"Why don't you call Dispatch and ask them what they recommend if
Detroit is bad."
Planning Episode H. At 5:19 the captain decides to divert south around the
storm...
"We got even worse stuff ahead. We gotta make a command decision..."
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And requests from ATC,
"...direct Des Moines."
Plannin_ Episode [. At 5:29 they consider changing altitude to save on fuel...
"What would be nice would be to see what our fuel burn would be if we
went up to 35 - 37,000 feet."
Planning Episode [. At 5:41 they decide to go lower from FL330 to FL290 to try
to reduce turbulence and take advantage of better winds...
"Think we ought to go back down? As soon as possible. The reason I say
that is the tailwind component is considerably less than at 29."
Plannin_ Episode K. At 5:58, the crew begins to consider alternate
destinations...
"You guys want to go to someplace that's wide open instead of taking our
chances at Cleveland?"
They reject Toledo, because it
"...looks shitty, too. With that much gas I don't like it."
They also consider Chicago...
"This is where it'd be nice to know what kind of delays there are in
Chicago. Normally we get that from Dispatch."
They finally decide to land at Milwaukee.
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